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What do lobbyists do? Some believe that lobbyists’ main role is to provide issue-specific information
and expertise to congressmen to help guide the law-making process. Others believe that lobbyists mainly
provide the firms and other special interests they represent with access to politicians in their “circle
of influence” and that this access is the be-all and end-all of how lobbyists affect the lawmaking process.
This paper combines a descriptive analysis with more targeted testing to get inside the black box of
the lobbying process and inform our understanding of the relative importance of these two views of
lobbying.  We exploit multiple sources of data covering the period 1999 to 2008, including: federal
lobbying registration from the Senate Office of Public Records, Federal Election Commission reports,
committee and subcommittee assignments for the 106th to 110th Congresses, and background information
on individual lobbyists. A pure issue expertise view of lobbying does not fit the data well. Instead,
maintaining connections to politicians appears central to what lobbyists do. In particular, we find that
whom lobbyists are connected to (through political campaign donations) directly affects what they
work on. More importantly, lobbyists appear to systematically switch issues as the politicians they
were previously connected to switch committee assignments, hence following people they know rather
than sticking to issues. We also find evidence that lobbyists that have issue expertise earn a premium,
but we uncover that such a premium for lobbyists that have connections to many politicians and Members
of Congress is considerably larger.
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1.  Introduction 
At the intersection between the political and the economic spheres lays the lobbying industry. 
Trillions of dollars of public policy intervention, government procurement, and budgetary items 
are constantly thoroughly scrutinized, advocated, or opposed by representatives of special 
interests. The sheer relevance of the 4 billion dollars federal lobbying industry has become 
evident in any aspect of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, including emergency financial market 
intervention (the TARP), financial regulation, countercyclical fiscal policy intervention, and 
healthcare reform
1. Notwithstanding its perceived fundamental role in affecting economic policy, 
very little systematic empirical research about the lobbying industry is available to economists 
and political scientists alike. For both sets of scholars what lobbyists do is a question without a 
definitive answer. 
A large part of the academic theoretical literature on interest groups has painted the lobbying 
process as one of information transmission: informed interest groups send cheap or costly signals 
to uninformed politicians.
2 This literature identifies a potentially welfare-enhancing role for the 
lobbying process, but has not produced substantial evidence in support of this mechanism. In this 
paper we take an indirect approach to this task by studying the intermediary between interest 
groups and policy makers, namely lobbyists. Stylized models of informational lobbying do not 
                                                            
1 See for instance Birnbaum (2008): “A key provision of the housing bill now awaiting action in the Senate -- and 
widely touted as offering a lifeline to distressed homeowners -- was initially suggested to Congress by lobbyists for 
major banks facing their own huge losses from the subprime mortgage crisis[…]” [Vital Part of Housing Bill Is 
Brainchild of Banks, 6/25/2008, The Washington Post] or Pear (2009): “In the official record of the historic House 
debate on overhauling health care, the speeches of many lawmakers echo with similarities. […] Statements by more 
than a dozen lawmakers were ghostwritten, in whole or in part, by Washington lobbyists working for Genetech, one 
of the world’s largest biotechnology companies.” [In House Many Spoke With One Voice: Lobbyists’, 11/15/2009, 
New York Times]. 
2 Grossman and Helpman (2001) offer an exhaustive literature review. The basic idea is that interest groups, 
although known to be biased, are credible to the politician if their preferences are sufficiently aligned with the 
politicians’ or the information they send is costly (or if it can be verified). Among the most prominent contributions 
are Crawford and Sobel (1982), Calvert (1985), Potters and Van Winden (1990, 1992, 1994), Austen-Smith (1992, 
1993, 1994, 1995), Austen-Smith and Wright (1994, 1996). A few papers have looked at the interactions between 
the two tools available to interest groups (information transmission and campaign support), e.g., Austen-Smith 




account for the presence of the lobbying industry as an intermediary, but understanding the role 
of the middlemen is important for two reasons. First it can offer some indirect evidence of how 
much of lobbying is indeed about information transmission. Second, given the large and growing 
size of the industry,
3 lobbyists are likely to be more than just messengers, and understanding 
what they do should inform theoretical models. 
With the goal of understanding what lobbyists do and why they are paid, this study considers two 
broad views of lobbying. Under one view, which resonates with the informational lobbying 
literature, lobbyists are experts who provide information to legislators and help guide their 
decision-making process. Such expertise might be particularly valuable when one considers that 
legislators themselves may have neither the technical background nor the time to delve into the 
detailed implications of all the pieces of legislation they are debating. This view is also 
maintained by the American League of Lobbyists, which on its official website states “Lobbying 
is a legitimate and necessary part of our democratic political process. Government decisions 
affect both people and organizations, and information must be provided in order to produce 
informed decisions.”
4  
This expertise view of lobbying stands in contrast with the view, held by many in the media and 
on the street, that lobbyists’ main asset is not what they know but instead whom they know.
5 In 
interviews with insiders, McGrath (2006) reports “There are three important things to know 
about lobbying: contacts, contacts, contacts.” What is valuable under this alternative view is not 
lobbyists’ expertise, but instead their access to various members of Congress through personal, 
and possibly also financial, connections.
6 This perspective does not completely rule out a flow of 
                                                            
3 See Appendix Table A1 
4 http://www.alldc.org/publicresources/lobbying.cfm 
5 See Salisbury et al. (1989) for an early discussion and test based on surveys of lobbyists and Apollonio, Cain and 
Drutman (2008, section B), Drutman (2010) for a recent discussion.  
6 It is important to notice, however, that such a view of lobbyists does not necessarily imply (even though it could be 
associated with) a quid-pro-quo aspect of the lobbying process. According to the “quid-pro-quo” view, politicians 
either modify their electoral platform or implement policies when in office and receive in exchange valuable 




information from interest groups to politicians, but excludes that lobbyists are the source of 
expertise. 
Sorting out these two views of lobbying is important because they differ in their implications for 
the quality of the legislative output. With very few exceptions, mostly limited to specific 
congressional studies, systematic evidence has eluded both political economists and political 
scientists.
7 Moreover, many of the existing studies report the lobbyists’ point of view on what 
lobbyists do, being based on surveys of insiders (Esterling, 2004; Heinz et al., 1993), a 
potentially biased representation relative to what lobbyists actually do. 
In this paper, we combine multiple data sources that help us paint a picture of the lobbying 
process over the last decade. This includes lobbying records as maintained by the Senate Office 
of Public Records (SOPR), lobbyists’ campaign contribution donations from the Federal Election 
Commission, and biographical information for a subset of lobbyists that we collect from an 
online registry. 
We first document basic facts about the expertise of lobbyists and connections between lobbyists 
and politicians. We build measures of expertise by looking at the entire set of lobbying records 
that are associated with a given lobbyist and evaluating how narrow or broad the range of issues 
a lobbyist’s name is associated with is. While we cannot directly observe lobbyists’ contacts with 
politicians, we propose to proxy for it with a count of the number of campaign contributions that 
lobbyists make to various politicians and Members of Congress. 
8 We remain agnostic as to what 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
objectives share this fundamental “quid-pro-quo” approach. A non-exhaustive list of papers that have employed this 
approach includes Austen-Smith (1987), Baron (1989), Baron (1994), Snyder (1990), Snyder (1991), Grossman and 
Helpman (1994, 1995, 1996), Dixit et al. (1997) and Besley and Coate (2001). Bombardini and Trebbi (2009) 
explore the interaction between monetary support and direct votes promised by interest groups but essentially 
maintain the quid-pro-quo approach. This strand of the literature has received a lot of attention from the empirical 
point of view, in particular in its application to the literature on endogenous trade policy (Goldberg and Maggi, 
1999; Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, 2000, Bombardini, 2008). 
7 Early related contributions include Langbein (1986), Salisbury et al. (1989), Wright (1990), Heinz et al. (1993). 
8 Wright (1990) is among the first to report a positive correlation between lobbying contacts and campaign 
contributions, while Ainsworth (1993) underscores that “indeed, there is evidence that campaign contributions 




these connections represent and prefer to keep the view that they proxy for any kind of contact 
between lobbyists and politicians. According to many scholars campaign contributions are 
simply a way to gain access to time-constrained politicians, “a chance to ‘tell their story’” 
(Sabato, 1985). The presence of such access costs is compatible with an informational view of 
lobbying, where those groups that gain access communicate useful information to the politician. 
But such connections could also represent personal relationships where the lobbyist’s expertise 
plays no role.  
We first establish some key trends in the data. In particular, we show that the steady growth in 
the size of the lobbying industry over the last decade has been paralleled with an also somewhat 
steady growth in the number of connections between lobbyists and politicians. Interestingly, the 
growth in lobbying has been almost exclusively driven by external lobbying, not in-house 
lobbying, with external lobbyists being those that maintain generally more ties to politicians (at 
least through individual campaign contributions). Furthermore, while connections to politicians 
appear on the rise among all types of lobbyists, the prevalence of issue expertise among lobbyists 
has been quite stable over the last decade.  
An important facet of the current media and policy debate surrounding lobbying has centered on 
the revolving door between positions on the Hill and positions in lobbying. On the one hand, 
revolving door lobbyists could be a key source of issue expertise, and restricting the ease with 
which these individuals can move from offices in Congress or government to the lobbying sector 
may result in the loss of valuable knowledge. On the other hand, this group might be particularly 
powerful in influencing current lawmakers due to overlapping social networks. Contrary to the 
first view, we establish unambiguously that revolving door lobbyists are not those with deeper 
issue expertise; what distinguishes them from other lobbyists is a much higher number of 
connections to politicians and current lawmakers. 
Simply counting the number of legislators a given lobbyist makes campaign contributions to 
obviously falls short of establishing that such connections play a role in the lobbying process. 
Indeed, a lobbyist may give campaign contributions to a set of politicians for reasons that are 




We therefore next dig deeper into understanding whether and how connections between lobbyists 
and politicians (through campaign contributions) matter for their job. We show that whom 
lobbyists make campaign contributions to is systematically related to what they work on. 
Specifically, a lobbyist that works on, say health care-related issues is systematically more likely 
to be connected (through campaign contributions) to legislators whose committee assignments 
include health care. Lobbyists’ donations are not given for purely personal reasons. The evidence 
rather hints at campaign contributions proxying for the lobbying activity of lobbyists, likely a 
tell-tale of the otherwise unobservable connection between lobbyists and congressmen. 
In what we see as one of the main contributions of the paper we attempt to disentangle whether 
whom or what lobbyists know drives their activity. We find evidence that lobbyists switch issues 
in a predictable way as the legislators they were previously connected to through campaign 
donations switch committee assignments. Hence, for example, a lobbyist that is connected to a 
legislator whose committee assignment includes health care in one Congress is more likely to 
cover defense-related issues in the next Congress if the legislator he or she is connected to is re-
assigned to defense in the next Congress. In other words, part of what lobbyists do appears to be 
a function of whom they know and have access to, rather than what they know. We however also 
see some evidence of lobbyists establishing connections to politicians that are entering a 
lobbyist’s prior area of activity due to a change in committee assignment. Hence, lobbyists’ 
connections operate as an exogenous driver of what issues they work on, but are also in part 
endogenously created to facilitate the transmission of knowledge and expertise to the relevant 
lawmakers. We view the first type of connections as representing underlying long-standing ties, 
while the second type reflects temporary links established in order to communicate the relevant 
information. 
In a complementary analysis, we ask what makes lobbyists more valuable, using the dollar value 
attached to the lobbying reports. We investigate what makes hiring the lobbying team on a given 
report expensive and find that, while having at least an expert on the team is important, having 
connected lobbyists brings twice as large a premium. This confirms the relevance of the first type 
of connections discussed above: the positive premium we estimate for connected lobbyists 




manifestation of deeper, harder to replicate, personal ties. The barriers to entry into establishing 
the type of connections of politicians we measure in the data (campaign contributions below 
$2,400) are very low compared to the premium they command; so what earns a premium is the 
relationship between lobbyists and politicians that certain campaign contributions embody.   
Also, to approximate the value of an individual lobbyist, we use some residual measure of the 
dollar value of the lobbying reports he or she is assigned to. Is the lobbyist’s value coming from 
his or her expertise in specific technical areas? Or is it coming from the connections that the 
lobbyist maintains with politicians and lawmakers? This additional analysis confirms that 
connections rather than issue expertise might be the relatively scarce resource lobbyists are 
bringing to the table. Finally, we check for changes in premia associated with “issue cycles”, that 
is whether returns respond to an issue becoming popular. We find no evidence that the return of a 
specialized lobbyist moves with the issue cycle, and it seems that most of the adjustment during 
a boom is through additional entry of non-specialists who start lobbying on that issue. 
Analogously to the issue cycle, we check for evidence of “political cycles” in the returns to 
lobbyists, and find an increase in the returns to lobbyists associated to a given party when that 
party is in a position of power.  
Can our findings rule out that lobbyists are experts or that they convey information? The 
evidence points to a relatively small role played by technical expertise,
9 but is consistent with a 
scenario where lobbyists connected to a given politician are valuable because they have a deep 
knowledge of that politician’s constituency,
10 and have built a relationship of trust and credibility 
vis-à-vis that politician. They could be communicating information, but their returns are 
seemingly more related to the complementary asset they bring to the table and to their role as 
intermediaries in the transmission of information.  
                                                            
9 Incidentally, it is easy to verify that large lobbying firms like Patton Boggs LLP or Cassidy and Associates employ 
very few individuals with background that points to specific technical training, even when the lobbying covers 
technical issues such as biotechnology or nuclear energy. See Table A-3 where report information extracted from the 
biographies of lobbyists posted online by the lobbying firms. 
10 Hansen (1991) suggests that “Lawmakers operate in highly uncertain environments. They have an idea of the 
positions they need to take to gain reelection, but they do not know for sure. Interest groups offer to help . . . They 




The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We first describe the pool of lobbyists and present 
some summary statistics on their professional background (Section 2). We then define our 
measures of expertise and connections, and discuss trends in those over the last decade (Section 
3). Section 4 briefly looks into which specific asset lobbyists are particularly endowed with 
(issue expertise or connections). We then move to more detailed tests of whether and how 
connections to politicians affect what lobbyists work on (Section 5). Section 6 presents our 
analysis of the premia associated with issue expertise, connections and past experience on the 
Hill or in government offices, along with an analysis of returns over “issue cycles” and “political 
cycles”. We conclude in Section 7. 
2.  The Lobbyists 
We use lobbying registration information from the Senate Office of Public Records (SOPR) to 
build a database of lobbyists for the period 1999 to 2008.
11 Each of the records filed with SOPR 
contains not only the name of the reporting firm and the name of the client firm or organization, 
but also the names of the individual lobbyists that were involved in this specific lobbying case. It 
is therefore possible to construct, starting with the lobbying records, a database that contains the 
names of all lobbyists that were active at the federal level over the last decade.
12 We identify 
                                                            
11 Data on lobbying expenditures from the Senate Office of Public Records has been previously employed in a very 
small number of papers, some of which utilize only a very limited subset of the available information. Ansolabehere, 
Snyder and Tripathi (2003) focus on the link between campaign contributions and lobbying and show that the two 
are correlated, consistently with a view that campaign contributions are a way for interest groups to buy access to 
politicians. Once access is gained lobbyists have a chance to voice the interests of their clients. The paper also shows 
that the pattern of campaign contributions varies according to the intensity of lobbying of a given group. 
Baumgertner and Leech (2001) offer a partial analysis of the distribution of lobbyists across issues, finding high 
concentration in some issues and very low in others. Bombardini and Trebbi (2008) study trade association lobbying 
in international trade, while Igan, Mishra and Tressel (2009) and Mian, Sufi and Trebbi (2010) study lobbying by 
home mortgage firms during the US housing market expansion. In an interesting and related paper Blanes-i-Vidal, 
Draca, and Fons-Rosen (2010) employ SOPR data to assess the drop in revenues occurring to a subset of lobbyists 
with past experience as senatorial aides when their Senator leaves office. 
12 Any type of information provision and research activity related to contacts to politicians requires registration. 
From the Office of the Clerk, Lobbying Disclosure Act Guidance: ‘Lobbying activity is defined in Section 3(7) as 
"lobbying contacts and efforts in support of such contacts, including . . . background work that is intended, at the 
time it is performed, for use in contacts, and coordination with the lobbying activities of others." If the intent of the 




about 37,000 individual lobbyists between 1999 and 2008. The Center for Responsive Politics 
lists on average 13,024 unique lobbyists per year between 1998 and 2010, varying from 10,404 
in 1998 to 14,869 in 2007.  
The SOPR data also allows us to separate the lobbyists into two sub-groups based on whether 
they are in-house lobbyists (these are the cases where the registering firm is the same as the 
client firm in the lobbying report) or whether they work for a lobbying firm that is representing 
another organization (the cases where the registering firm is different from the client firm). In 
what follows, we refer to the former group as the “internal” (or in-house) lobbyists and to the 
latter group as the “external” lobbyists.
13 We can also use the SOPR data to compute, for each 
lobbyist*year observation: number of years of experience (with the caveat of the right-tail 
truncation), and number of records the lobbyist name is attached to in a given year. Furthermore, 
we can compute how many years a given lobbyist appears as active over the sample period (10 
years at most). 
We rely on www.lobbyists.info to obtain additional time-invariant background information about 
the lobbyists we identify in the lobbying records. This website, which was originally derived 
from the directory “Washington Representatives” and is maintained by Columbia Books & 
Information Services (CBIS), is the best information source we are aware of for federal 
lobbyists. Often included on the website are short biographies that allow us to further profile the 
lobbyists. In particular, we searched for specific strings in this online directory to build a set of 
background experience indicators, such as whether a lobbyist has “Republican” or “Democrat” 
associations, whether the lobbyist has “House” or “Senate” or “White House” experience, or 
whether the lobbyist is referred to as “Hon.” (the explicit title for former members of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
individual paid to perform such activities in excess of 20% of his work time and who establishes more than one 
lobbying contact with a politician over a quarter has to register as lobbyist. 
13 If a lobbyist ever appears as both internal and external in a given year, we arbitrarily categorize her as external in 
that year. When we collapse the panel data at the lobbyist level, we also categorize as external a lobbyist that 





14 Not all lobbyists identified in the SOPR data appear on www.lobbyists.info; in 
practice, we found about 14,000 of the 37,000 lobbyists identified in the SOPR data in 
www.lobbyists.info.
15  
Table 1 summarizes the lobbyist-level data; the unit of observation is a lobbyist and all lobbyists 
are equally weighted to compute these summary statistics. About 40 percent of lobbyists work 
in-house. The average lobbyist appears in the data for about four years and has nearly two years 
of experience; he/she is associated with about 5 lobbying records in a typical active year. Among 
those lobbyists that we can find in www.lobbyist.info, 97 percent have some biographical 
information associated with their name. Among those, about 11 percent have some association to 
the Republican party and about 9.8 percent to the Democratic party. A bit more than 1 percent of 
the lobbyists for which we could find biographical information are former members of 
Congress.
16 About 2 percent of the biographies mention some experience in the White House. 
There is also a large representation of former “aides” (11 percent) and individuals with 
experience in senators’ offices (around 10 percent).
17 
Table 2 shows how lobbyists’ background has changed over the years. The most dramatic 
change over time appears to be in the share of in-house lobbyists, which has declined from 
nearly 60 percent at the beginning of the sample period to less than 40 percent by the end. In 
                                                            
14 To be specific, we first downloaded the whole directory by running a blank search on the database. Second, we 
run a series of searches conditional on matching certain strings of text in the bio, like "senate" or "house" or 
"Democrat", etc. Third, we merged together every single list against the whole set of lobbyists, generating a dummy 
conditional on the matching being successful (i.e. you get Democrat=1 if you are in the output of that search). Prior 
to converging on this coding method, we run about 200 manual spot searches to check that the method was 
producing reliable results.  
15 Maybe not surprisingly given that we downloaded the directory information in 2009, we are more successful at 
identifying lobbyists that were active in the later part of the sample period than lobbyists that were active at the first 
few years. The match rate varies between the upper 30 percents at the beginning of the period to the mid 60 percents 
towards the end. Those lobbyists that can be identified in www.lobbyists.info typically have more years of 
experience and are associated with more lobbying records in each active year. See Table 1. 
16 A majority of those are ex-House Representatives, and about equal shares come from the right and left wings of 
the political spectrum (.7 percent and .6 percent, respectively). 




fact, as can be seen in Appendix Table A1, the rapid growth in total lobbying expenses over the 
last decade (about a 30 percent increase) can be almost exclusively accounted for by a growth of 
external lobbying, which doubled over the sample period. In-house lobbying instead, while up in 
the first part of the last decade, was back down to its starting level by the end of the decade. 
While this is not the central topic of this paper, this does suggest that building an understanding 
of the recent growth of lobbying expenses should start with identifying the key drivers of the 
external lobbying process. In what follows, we make sure to present separate analysis for 
external and internal lobbying.
18 
Now, despite an active media coverage that might have suggested the contrary, there is no 
systematic evidence (at the individual lobbyist level at least) that the revolving door is more open 
today than it was in the past. The share of active lobbyists in 2008 that were, for example, former 
members of Congress, is smaller by 2008 than it was in 1999. Similarly, there are fewer (in 
percentage terms) active lobbyists in 2008 that have experience in the White House or 
experience as “aide” or in a senate office than there was in 1999. Much of the decline in the 
share of revolving door lobbyists appears to be concentrated in the second half of the sample 
period. 
3.  Expertise and Connections 
3.A. Expertise 
One of the prevailing views of what lobbyists do is that they support overly burdened legislators 
(and regulators) with much needed expertise on often complicated topics, and therefore provide 
valuable guidance in the lawmaking and rulemaking processes. In this section, we construct 
measures of expertise (or specialization) at both the lobbyist and lobbying firm levels; we also 
describe trends in those measures over time. 
                                                            
18 A widely held view of internal lobbyists is of watchdogs monitoring the day-to-day activity of Congress flagging 
potential issues of interests for their company (and calling in the professional external lobbyists when necessary). 
Such activity does not appear to require any particular expertise or connections. Hrebenar and Morgan (2009) 
highlight how many of the in-house lobbyists are also not full-time lobbyists and often volunteer or amateur 




We propose to measure the extent to which lobbyists are experts by assessing how narrow or 
broad the range of issues they are assigned to is. This can be done with the SOPR data. 
Associated with each report is a checklist of all the issues a given report is covering. (The full list 
of issues is reported in Appendix A1. A sample report is presented in Appendix A2.) More 
precisely, consider a report r at time t. The report lists a number of issues Irt (where Irt is bound 
between 1 and 76 possible issues), the name of all Lrt lobbyists employed and the dollar amount 
paid for lobbying services on those issues Irt at time t, Vrt. Let us assume that the report value is 
divided symmetrically across all lobbyists, so that the service of each lobbyist l in the report is 
valued        
   
   
. If we impute this value symmetrically to all issues, then the dollar amount for 
issue i and lobbyist l on report r at time t is         
    
   
. If lobbyist l works on     reports then 
we can indicate by      the value of lobbying on issue i so that        ∑      
   
    .  We sum      
across all active years for lobbyist l to obtain    . Using these dollar values as weights, we 
compute for each lobbyist l an issue-based Herfindahl Index (HHI) that measures how 
concentrated this lobbyist’s assignments are across all possible issues I: 
HHI      





   
 
where       ∑    
 
    . Hence, a lobbyist whose name is attached to only one issue across all 
lobbying records over the last decade would be assigned an HHI of 1. As a complementary 
measure, we also generate a dummy variable called “specialist” that equals 1 if a lobbyist spends 
(in dollar terms) at least a quarter of his assignments in each active year on the same issue. We 
call a “generalist” a lobbyist that never spends (i.e. in no active year) more than a quarter of his 
assignments on the same issue. 
The measures of specialization we propose are subject to both downward and upward sources of 
bias. First, there are typically multiple lobbyists assigned to a given lobbying report (the mean 
across reports is 3; the median is 2), and it is possible that not all the lobbyists whose names is 




such within-report specialization occurs, we cannot account for it; this will lead us to 
underestimate how specialized a given lobbyist is. Second, because lobbyists typically do not 
work for many years in our data (the average number of active years is about 4), our proposed 
specialization measures may mistakenly classify as specialists those lobbyists that appear on only 
a very limited number of reports or work for a very limited number of years; this will lead us to 
overestimate the degree of specialization. 
Table 3 presents means and trends over time in the average level of expertise in the unbalanced 
panel of lobbyists (e.g. a panel that includes only lobbyists in the years in which they are active). 
All lobbyist-year observations are equally weighted in the construction of these statistics. Across 
all years and all lobbyists (Table 3, Panel A), our expertise measures lead us to qualify about a 
quarter of lobbyists as specialists and about another quarter as generalists; the average issue-
based HHI in the lobbyist panel is .34. There is no monotonic trend over time in the share of 
specialists or the HHI measure; if anything, the share of specialists seems to have gone down in 
the first half of the decade and back up in the second half. Panel B replicates the same statistics 
but restricts the panel to the subset of lobbyists that appear in the lobbying data for at least 4 
years. As we had anticipated, the share of specialists drops somewhat in this subsample (19 
percent across all years, respectively); the HHI measure is basically unchanged. In this 
subsample, we again see no systematic trend in expertise over the sample period. 
Panels C and D report means and trends in specialization for external and internal lobbyists, 
respectively. External lobbyists are more likely to be specialists than internal lobbyists (mean of 
.3 vs. .2 across all years) and less likely to be generalists (mean of .13 vs. .4 across all years). In 
neither of these two subsamples do we observe systematic trend in issue expertise over time. 
Figure 1A displays the distribution of the share of specialists across lobbying entities for the 
entire sample period. Our motivation for looking at such distribution is the possibility that a 
subset of lobbying firms might want to differentiate by “specializing in specialization.” Under 
this view, one might expect multiple modes when plotting the distribution of the specialist share 




every lobbyist to the firm he or she is working for.
19 The distribution of specialist share in 
professional lobbying organizations does appear bimodal, with a large mode around 0 and 
another much smaller mode around 1; the distribution for in-house lobbying teams does not 
display any mode at 1.  
3.B. Connections 
In contrast with the view that lobbyists add issue expertise to the law- and rulemaking process is 
the view that lobbyists’ main asset is their social network and, in particular, their personal 
relations to lawmakers. In the words of Hon. John Boehner “many of the lobbyists who enter our 
offices every day to represent their clients are, for all practical purposes, complete mysteries to 
us. Yet for the House to function, some degree of trust is necessary. Many lobbyists are of the 
highest integrity and feel as much of a duty to the House as a democratic institution as they do to 
their clients. But there’s every incentive for those with more questionable ethics to shortchange 
us and the House. And absent our personal, longstanding relationships, there is no way for us to 
tell the difference between the two.” 
20 
While investigative journalism has given us detailed accounts of relationships between 
legislators and lobbyists, these accounts only provide spotty pictures that cannot be generalized 
to the entire lobbying industry or lawmaking group. A clear difficulty in terms of painting a more 
complete picture is to build a systematic measure of connections. We propose to exploit 
information on campaign contributions lobbyists make to politicians to construct such a measure. 
Specifically, we search the campaign contribution records kept by the Federal Election 
Commission to identify all campaign contributions made by the lobbyists identified in the SOPR 
data. For each lobbyist, we can measure whether he or she has made at least one contribution to a 
                                                            
19 In computing this measure, we weigh each lobbyist-firm observation by the number of records he or she was listed 
on across the entire sample period and restrict ourselves to the sample of organizations that employ at least two 
lobbyists over the entire sample period. 




campaign over the sample period
21; we can count a lobbyist’s average number of contributions in 
any given Congress; and we can also tag those lobbyists that make “many” campaign 
contributions in any given Congress (we arbitrarily define “many” as five or more). 
One clear concern about this measure is that it may systematically miss strong connections 
between lobbyists and politicians, as such connections may not require campaign contributions. 
To build some sense of how much of a concern this is, we considered a group of 50 lobbyists 
with family members serving in Congress (source: Public Citizen, 2007). There is arguably no 
connection stronger than family ties. Were campaign contributions just a weak substitute for 
closer ties, we would expect to see no connections as we measure them (e.g. through political 
donations) between these lobbyists and their family members in Congress. In fact, we found that 
30 percent of these 50 lobbyists make campaign contributions to their family members. As an 
additional check, we also made use of a list of 21 lobbyists and public affairs consultants with 
strong ties to Republican Congressman John A. Boehner published by the New York Times
22. 
Cross-checking with FEC individual campaign contribution data we were able to recover 52 
percent of the connections. Hence, our connection measure, while certainly noisy, will arguably 
correlate with strong ties.
23 
Another concern about this measure could be that, while a lobbyist may be connected to a 
politician, it is really the client hiring the lobbyist that is paying the campaign contributions to 
the politician, and not the lobbyist directly. This alternative concern may be partially addressed 
by considering the relationship between the campaign contributions received by politicians from 
lobbyists and from their clients respectively. While it is particularly cumbersome to explore any 
possible client-lobbyist-congressman connection in the data, the Center for Responsive Politics 
(CRP) presents lobbyist-client clusters of donations to members of Congress between January 
                                                            
21 FEC disclosure requires indicating the individual name, occupation and employer of the donor, allowing a precise 
match to SOPR data. 
22 Lipton (2010) [A GOP Leader Tightly Bound to Lobbyists, 09/11/2010, New York Times]. 
23 On second thought, this might be intuitive. While it is reasonable to assume that politicians certainly allow 
communication without payment from closely connected lobbyists, the strong ties are also the first to be pulled 




2007 and June 2009.
24 Clients must be members of the health care/health insurance industry and 
have hired at least ten outside lobbyists who display some campaign contribution to the same 
Congressmen as the clients contributed to. Under the view requiring clients to carry the bulk of 
the campaign donations relative to their lobbyists, the amount of campaign contributions 
received by congressmen from clients should vastly exceed the lobbyists’ donations. Quite the 
contrary, for 52 out of 61 congressmen identified by the CRP as recipients of lobbyist-client 
bundles the amount of lobbyists’ contributions exceeds what paid by clients. The lobbyist-client 
difference is large and statistically significant with lobbyists contributing on average $14,642 
more than their clients, an average relative difference of about +50.4%. 
Table 4 reports means and trends for the campaign contributions measures. The unit of 
observation is a given lobbyist in an active year and all observations are equally weighted when 
computing the statistics. Across all lobbyist-year observations (Panel A), the fraction of lobbyists 
with at least one donation is 27 percent; about 8 percent make contributions to more than 5 
politicians in the average year they are active as lobbyists. The trends analysis reveals an upward 
swing in both the frequency and number of donations, with maybe a bit of a slowdown in the last 
sample year. When we focus on lobbyists with staying power (those active in lobbying for at 
least 4 years between 1999 and 2008 – Panel B), the pattern of increased connectivity over time 
between lobbyists and politicians becomes even clearer: for example, while only about 9 percent 
of lobbyists active in 1999 are of the type that makes campaign contributions to 5 politicians or 
more in a given Congress, that fraction goes up to 13 percent by 2007/2008. 
A comparison of panels C and D reveals a large difference between in-house and external 
lobbyists. Connections through campaign contributions are much more common among external 
lobbyists than among those that work in-house. For example, while we categorize about 14 
percent of external lobbyists as with “many connections”, 3 percent of in-house ones fall into this 
category. Figure 1B displays the distribution of the share of lobbyists with “many connections” 
across lobbying entities for the entire sample period. As for Figure 1A, our motivation for 






differentiate by “specializing in connections.” Under this view, one might expect multiple modes 
when plotting the distribution of the share of very connected lobbyists across firms. As for 
Figure 1A, we compute the share of very connected lobbyists in a firm by weighing each 
lobbyist-firm observation by the number of records he or she was listed on across the entire 
sample period and we restrict ourselves to the sample of organizations that employ at least two 
lobbyists over the entire sample period. The distribution of the share of connected lobbyists 
appears to be very spread out among professional lobbying firms. There is a large mode around 
0, but also two smaller modes around .5 and 1. 
4.  Background Determinants of Expertise and Connections 
Table 5 relates specialization to lobbyist’s biographical information.
25 The unit of observation is 
a lobbyist and all lobbyists are equally weighted in these OLS regressions. We present 
regressions both for all lobbyists (odd columns) and for those with at least 4 years of presence in 
the SOPR data (even columns). The dependent variable in the first 6 columns is the “specialist” 
dummy; the dependent variable in the last 6 columns is the issue-based HHI. The main theme 
that emerges from this Table is that lobbyists with prior political experience or political 
affiliations are less likely to be experts. For example (column 2), lobbyists with prior association 
with the Republican or Democratic party are about 5 percentage points less likely to be 
specialists; former members of Congress are about another 3 percentage points less likely to be 
specialist (not statistically significant); those lobbyists with experience in some White House 
offices are another 5 percentage points less likely to be specialist. There is also some evidence 
(especially apparent with the more continuous HHI measure in Panel B) that expertise tends to 
be a more common asset for older lobbyists (e.g. those whose biographies go back to the 1960s 
and 1970s). The patterns above appear to be more systematic and more precisely estimated 
among external lobbyists. 
In summary, the regressions in Table 5 appear to contradict the view that expertise on specific 
technical issues is the main asset being transferred through the revolving door between Capitol 
                                                            
25 The sample here is of course smaller, e.g. limited to the subset of lobbyist we could identify in www.lobbyist.info 




Hill or offices in the executive branch and the lobbying world. Of course, it could be other forms 
of expertise that this selected group of lobbyists is bringing to the table, such as some general 
knowledge of the law-making process. Our results do however contradict the view that revolving 
door lobbyists bring specific knowledge of complex topics such as, say, health care policy or the 
economics of financial markets. 
Following the same format as Table 5, Table 6 relates lobbyists’ contacts to politicians to their 
biographical information. Again, the unit of observation in this Table is a lobbyist and all 
lobbyists are equally weighted. There is unambiguous evidence that past experience on the Hill 
or in the White House is associated with more connections to politicians through campaign 
contributions. Consider the last 6 columns, where the dependent variable is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the lobbyist makes campaign contributions to at least 5 politicians in the average 
Congress we observe him in the lobbying records. We find (column 7) that lobbyists with 
associations with the Republican or Democratic parties are respectively 10 and 14 percentage 
points more likely to fall in this “many connections” category. Former members of Congress and 
those with some prior experience around the White House are respectively another 14 and 10 
percentage points more likely to maintain many connections to politicians. 
Table 7 provides some evidence on which lobbyists make campaign contributions to which 
politician. We perform this analysis separately by Congress and present results for the 107
th and 
108
th Congresses. Within each Congress, we restrict ourselves to the subset of lobbyists for 
whom we could find background information on www.lobbyist.info and are active during that 
term and to the subset of politicians that are Members of Congress during that term. We then 
create all possible lobbyist-lawmaker pairs (by cross-matching the list of lobbyists with the list of 
Congressmen and women) and create a dummy variable that equals 1 if the lobbyist in a pair has 
made a campaign contribution to the lawmaker in that pair, 0 otherwise. We perform the analysis 
both with and without lobbyist and lawmaker fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 
lobbyist level. Maybe not surprisingly, whether a given lobbyist contributes to a given 
politician’s campaign is systematically related to whether the lobbyist and the politician share the 




5.  Are Connections to Politicians Related to What Lobbyists Do? 
The empirical approach we have followed so far to measure how connected a given lobbyist is 
has consisted in counting the number of politicians the lobbyist makes campaign contributions 
to. However, there is nothing in the way we constructed this measure that systematically 
establishes a link between these campaign contributions and the lobbyists' main professional 
activities. Lobbyists, like any other individuals, may decide to express their personal support for 
a political candidate by giving to their political campaign. Such personal taste would be 
consistent with our findings in Table 7 where lobbyists’ campaign donations follow ideological 
lines. Yet, in this section, we show that there is more to the campaign contributions than just a 
private showing of political support. Whom lobbyists give to (and most likely whom lobbyists 
know) is systematically related to what issues they work on. In fact, we will show later in this 
section evidence for a much stronger result: lobbyists appear to change issues in a predictable 
way as the legislators they are connected to (through campaign contributions made in the past) 
change committee assignments. 
The nature of the empirical exercise we perform in Table 8 is as follows. As in Table 7, we 
perform our analysis separately by Congress and present for now results for the 107
th and 108
th 
Congress. (We obtained qualitatively similar results for the other sessions of Congress covered in 
our sample time period). We start with the pool of all Senators and House Representatives in a 
given Congress. We then use committee assignment information to determine the specific 
lobbying issues
26 each of these Members of Congress are particularly tied to in that Congress.
27 
For instance, the powerful House Appropriations committee maps into the lobbying Budget issue 
(BUD). As we did for Table 7, we then create a dataset that includes all possible lobbyist-
legislator pairs in a given Congress by crossing the pool of active lobbyists with the pool of 
lawmakers.  
                                                            
26 For the full list see SOPR instructions for Lobbying Disclosure files (line 11) available at 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/LD1_Instructions.pdf  
27 Appendix A3 reports the correspondence matrix between House and Senate committees and lobbying issues. The 




For each lobbyist-legislator pair, it is possible to construct some measures of the “issue overlap” 
between the legislator and the lobbyist in the pair. The first measure we propose simply counts 
the number of issues a given legislator is assigned to (given his or her committee position in that 
Congress), that also appear in at least one of the lobbying records associated with the lobbyist 
during that session of Congress. We also define a dummy variable that equals 1 for a lobbyist-
legislator pair if the lobbyist’s records during that session of Congress cover all the issues 
assigned to the legislator in that Congress, 0 otherwise. 
In this sample of all possible lobbyist-legislator pairs in a given Congress, we then test whether 
the issue overlap between the lobbyist and legislator in the pair is systematically larger when the 
pair actually exists in the campaign contribution data, e.g. when the lobbyist made a campaign 
contribution to that legislator in any of the two years that Congress was in session. 
The first four columns of Table 8 focus on the 108
th Congress, the last four on the 107
th 
Congress. Reported in each column is the estimated coefficient on a dummy variable that equals 
1 if the lobbyist made a campaign contribution to the legislator, 0 otherwise. Note that for each 
overlap measure and Congress we report the results of two regressions: one with legislator fixed 
effects and one with lobbyist fixed effects; such fixed effects are important since, for example, 
the overlap measures we have defined may largely vary across legislators simply based on 
whether they are assigned to narrowly-focused committees or committees with broader 
mandates. Also, standard errors are clustered at the lobbyist level. 
There is systematic evidence across all Congresses that the existence of a campaign contribution 
connection between a lobbyist and a legislator is associated with a higher likelihood that the 
lobbyist and legislator work on the same issues. For example, the likelihood of a perfect issue 
overlap between a lobbyist and a legislator (e.g. the lobbying records associated with that 
lobbyist during that session of Congress cover all the issues associated with the legislator's 
committee) in a random pair in the 108
th Congress is 11.5 percent. The likelihood increases by 
2.9 percentage points, or about 25 percent if the lobbyist made a campaign contribution to that 
legislator (column 3, Table 8), controlling for whether the lobbyist and legislator share political 




The evidence put forward in Table 8 suggests that campaign contributions are not simply a 
reflection of the lobbyists’ personal political tastes; instead, lobbyists’ campaign contributions 
are systematically related to the lobbyists’ professional engagements. 
Before exploring different mechanisms that might explain this evidence, we take a first step 
towards understanding better how connections between lobbyists and politicians relate to their 
respective work assignments by replicating the analysis from Table 8 on various relevant 
subsamples of the data. Again, we report results only for the 107
th and 108
th Congress but have 
obtained qualitatively similar results for other time periods. A few consistent patterns emerge 
from the heterogeneity analysis presented in Table 9. First, it appears that the correlation 
between issue overlap and campaign contributions is limited to the set of external lobbyists. For 
in-house lobbyists, we do not seem able to predict what issues they work on based on whom they 
make campaign contributions to. This is obviously likely related to the fact that campaign 
contributions by in-house lobbyists are a much rarer occurrence (Table 5).
28 Interestingly, the 
association between campaign contributions and issue overlap is quantitatively stronger among 
expert lobbyists than among non-experts, even though a statistically significant association exists 
for both groups. 
The statistical associations we have isolated in Tables 8 and 9 imply a relationship between 
whom lobbyists know and what they work on. There are however many different ways to 
interpret such a relationship. We are particularly interested in separating two possible 
interpretations. The first interpretation is that what determines what a lobbyist works on is whom 
he or she knows: because a lobbyist knows a given politician (as proxied for by making 
contributions to that politician’s campaign), he or she has influence on that politician and 
therefore is particularly effective in affecting outcomes related to the issues this politician’s 
committee covers. In a sense, under this first interpretation, whom a lobbyist knows comes first 
and this determines in great part what he or she works on. A second interpretation is that what a 
                                                            
28 It is possible though that, for in-house lobbyists, we are missing a big part of the connections to politicians as 
those may occur through campaign contributions directly made by the firms and organizations that employ those 




lobbyist knows determines which politician he or she is more likely to establish some 
connections with. Under this second interpretation, lobbyists are defined by what they know 
more than whom they know. However, there is some friction in the communication of this 
expertise, maybe because of lawmakers’ overburdened schedule and limited attention span. 
Campaign contributions are then a way to get politicians’ attention; they serve as some grease in 
the transmission of information and expertise between lobbyists and lawmakers. In Tables 10 
and 11, we present a concrete attempt at parceling out these two mechanisms. 
In Tables 10A, B and C, we present an empirical test of whether lobbyists “stick to” the people 
they know when it comes to what issues they work on. If lobbyists essentially provide companies 
with access to politicians in their “circle of influence,” one would expect lobbyists’ job 
assignments to be determined by the identity of the politicians in charge, independent of the 
specific issues being decided upon; hence a lobbyist should “follow” a congressman that he or 
she knows as the congressman moves from one committee assignment to another. 
To perform that test, we isolate the subset of Congressmen that switch committee assignments 
between Congress t and Congress t+1. Such switches can be safely assumed exogenous to the 
lobbyist’s decision, as mostly driven by congressmen’s tenure and idiosyncratic electoral shocks 
to members of the committee. We form all the possible pairs between a given Congressman and 
the lobbyists in our sample and create issue overlap in the pair at t as previously defined (the 
number of issues that the politician works on at time t that are covered by the lobbyist at time t). 
Because of computational constraints we cannot consider all the lobbyists in the sample, so we 
adopt the strategy of keeping only those that work on similar issues as the politician before the 
reassignment. For this group it is easier to establish whether the lobbyist follows the 
Congressman given a common point of “departure”. We therefore keep the 1000 lobbyists (and 
therefore pairs) that are closest to the Congressman in terms of issue overlap at time t. The data 
set is formed by appending 1000 pairs for each “switcher” for each Congress. Notice that there 
are 513 Congressman that switch assignment at some point in the period considered, so we have 
513,000 pairs. For each pair we create a connection dummy variable that is one if the lobbyist 




We then ask in Table 10A whether the overlap of issues covered by the lobbyist and the 
Congressman in t+1 can be predicted by whether the pair was connected in Congress t. The 
dependent variable is the number of new issues
29 that both lobbyist and politician work on at 
time t+1. As a control, the overlap between the lobbyist in Congress t and Congressman in 
Congress  t+1 captures the fact that the lobbyist may be already working on the issues the 
legislator takes up as new assignment. 
In all columns of Table 10A we find evidence that lobbyists follow the lawmakers that they have 
connections with, as those lawmakers switch committee assignments. Specifically, we find a 
larger overlap in Congress t+1 when the lobbyist had previously made campaign contributions to 
the politician in the pair. Starting from column 1 where we only include Congress fixed effects, 
the results are qualitatively unchanged if we add Congressman fixed effects (column 2), controls 
for the lobbyist characteristics (column 3), lobbyist fixed effects (columns 6 to 8), issue overlap 
at t, or if we limit our analysis to the lobbyist.info sample (columns 4 and 5). In columns 6 to 8, 
the analysis based on within lobbyist variation confirms that, given a lobbyist, he is more likely 
to follow a politician when he is connected to him. At a mean 1.3 overlap of new issues at t+1 
the estimated effect ranges between about 8 and 28 percent additional overlap for connected 
lobbyists. 
In Table 10B we look at possible heterogeneity of this finding across relevant subsamples of 
lobbyists and lawmakers. First, we see that the relationship we have uncovered only applies to 
external lobbyists. Moreover, the relationship between prior connections and future work 
assignments seem to exist only for non-specialists. 
In Table 10C we repeat the analysis in the sample of freshmen, i.e. Congressmen that enter 
Congress at t+1. Notice that we still observe contributions during the campaign stage and 
therefore all variables of interest, except for issue overlap at t, can be defined for this sample. 
Since we are including all lobbyists, table 10C performs the analysis separately for sets of 
Congresses, for computational reasons. The results are largely confirmed: as freshmen are 
                                                            




elected and are assigned to given committees, lobbyists who gave them campaign contributions 
start working on the same issues (controlling for whether the lobbyist was already working on 
those issues). 
An alternative and simple, although indirect, way of quantifying the degree to which lobbyists 
enter new issues as politicians switch to new committee assignments is to relate the amount of 
churning for these two groups. More specifically, for each issue and congress we calculate the 
fraction of new congressmen assigned to the issue and the share of dollars spent on the issue 
coming from lobbyists that did not work on the issue in the prior congress.  When weighting by 
dollar amount attached to the issues, the correlation between the two “entry” variables is 40%. 
This implies that, if all congressmen were new to an issue, then 40% of lobbyists in dollars terms 
would be new to the issue. This figure is 80% if we limit the analysis to those issue-congress 
observations that are above the median in terms of the share of Congressmen that have at least 
one connection to lobbyists. 
Table 11 provides evidence that connections to politicians are also endogenously created by 
lobbyists as new lawmakers enter their area of expertise. We again restrict the sample to the 
subset of lawmakers that switch committee assignments between two consecutive sessions of 
Congress. We form all pairs of these politicians with every lobbyist in Congress t+1 and for 
computational reasons we analyze only two Congresses (107
th and 108
th). The dependent 
variable is now a dummy that equals 1 if the lobbyist made at least one campaign contribution to 
the lawmaker in the pair in Congress t+1. The independent variable of interest is a measure of 
issue overlap between the lobbyist at t and the Congressman at time t+1. More specifically we 
define a ‘lead’ issue overlap as the number of issues covered by Congressman at time t+1 that 
are covered by the lobbyist at time t. The question we ask is whether, as the ‘lead’ issue overlap 
increases, i.e. a politician moves at t+1 into issues coinciding with those already covered by the 
lobbyist at time t, the lobbyist is more likely to establish a connection with that politician. We 
control for whether a connection was already established at time t and for issue overlap at time t. 
We find a significant effect of lead issue overlap on connection at time t. The coefficients in the 
full sample range are positive and statistically significant, implying a higher propensity to 




range between 0.00069 and 0.00059 (Table 11 reports coefficients in x1000 units), so that a one 
unit increase in lead issue overlap increases the probability of a connection being established by 
29.5% to 34.5% relative to the average probability of a connection (0.2%). The heterogeneity 
analysis in the remaining columns of Table 11 suggests again that the relationship we observe 
mostly extends to the pool of external lobbyists. 
The evidence in Tables 10 and 11 suggests that there are two broad types of connections. Some 
connections are long-standing and come first in determining what a lobbyist works on. Other 
connections are created as politicians enter the area of activity of a lobbyist. 
6.  What Makes a Lobbyist Valuable? 
6.A. Report-level Analysis 
Our analysis so far suggests that lobbyists’ personal access to lawmakers, as proxyied for by the 
campaign contributions they make to these lawmakers, might be a consequential driver of what 
issues they work on. A complementary approach to assess the relative importance of access 
versus issue expertise in the lobbying process might consist in asking how much these two assets 
are valued. Who is paid more? Is it a lobbyist with lots of connections to politicians, or a lobbyist 
that masters the intricate details of health care policy or financial market reforms? Unfortunately, 
we do not have any information on lobbyists’ income.
30 But we do observe the price tag 
associated with each lobbying report. It is therefore possible to assess how the characteristics of 
the lobbyists that are assigned to a report relate to how much was spent on that report. We 
perform this analysis in Table 13. Because of computational constraints and because the previous 
                                                            
30 Concerning payment structures: “There are several fee structures on K Street, from annual retainers and lump 
sums for specific projects to monthly and even hourly rates. […]. Some firms with stellar reputations for gaining 
access to high levels of government charge annual fees and usually take on whatever lobby efforts, large or small, 
are required during the term of the contract. Sometimes, when things are heating up in Washington, clients will 
often drop big money to make sure that their Washington representatives have the pedal to the floor until the race is 
run. But it is most common to find clients paying a monthly rate. Universities, local and municipal governments, and 
companies that are most closely focused on the appropriations process pay fees of between $5,000 and $30,000 a 
month. […] Several lobbyists say prices are negotiable, depending on the length of the lobbying relationship, the 
intensity of the work, and the client's perceived ability to pay […]."” [LobbySearch: The Who, When, and How 




patterns we have documented are much more pronounced for external lobbyists we limit our 
analysis to this group. An obvious limitation of this empirical approach is that we cannot isolate 
the contribution of an individual lobbyist to a given report (recall that most report have more 
than one lobbyist assigned to it). In Table 14, we will present an alternative approach where we 
try to get at individual lobbyists’ value-added to a given report by estimating a vector of lobbyist 
fixed effects.  
Before discussing the record-level analysis in Table 13, we report in Table 12 the total dollar 
decomposition of lobbying aggregate amounts by category of lobbyists. Connected lobbyists and 
lobbyists with multiple connections not only command a very large share of the industry in terms 
of aggregate revenues, but also stand out in terms of amounts per lobbyists (connected lobbyists 
cover 42 percent of the revenues but are only 25 percent of the industry population). Specialists 
command substantially lower shares, even if they represent 25 percent of the population. For 
external lobbyists the patterns are even more pronounced.  
The disproportionate returns accruing to lobbyists with connections in this simple decomposition 
is a recurring theme in the remainder of this section. We have documented the existence of two 
types of connections through campaign donations. One conforms to the standard “pay to play” 
view of campaign contributions: a link is temporarily established by a lobbyist to access the 
relevant politician (Sabato, 1985). The other stands in for deeper and hard-to-replicate ties. 
However, only the latter can command a premium in excess of what is necessary to pay for 
access, i.e. individual campaign donations (currently capped at $2,400 by the FEC). The high 
returns to connectedness estimated below largely exceed such amount, lending support to the 
hypothesis that a significant fraction of the observed connections stand in for deeper and long-
standing relationships. 
The prominence of premia to connections over expertise is evident in the report-level analysis of 
Table 13. The unit of analysis is an external lobbying record, as defined in the SOPR data. The 
dependent variable is the logarithm of the dollar amount attached to that report, ln(Vrt). All 
regressions reported in Table 13 include a vector of year dummies, a vector of dummies for 




issues that are being covered in the report. We also control non-parametrically for the number of 
lobbyists included on the report (with separate indicator variables for all numbers –from 1 to 62). 
Finally, all regressions include controls for the average tenure of the lobbyists assigned to the 
report, as well as the average number of active years among these lobbyists over the entire 
sample period and the average number of reports per lobbyist on the team per year. For ease of 
interpretation we construct two dummy variables. The first one equals 1 if there is at least one 
specialist in one of the issues covered by the report. The second dummy equals 1 if there is at 
least a lobbyist on the report that is connected to a politician that works on an issue in that report. 
We find qualitatively similar results across all specifications. Specifically, everything else equal, 
we find a premium of about 3 to 5 percent for a lobbying report that has a relevant specialist, 
while that premium is about 8 to 10 percent for a report with a relevant connected lobbyist. 
Overall, having a specialist on the team comes at a premium, but having connected lobbyists 
commands a premium twice as large. Given an average report amount Vrt of $63,200, this 
implies a per-report premium of $5,056-$6,320 per connected lobbyist
31. 
The last column of Table 13 introduces a number of characteristics of the lobbyists on the report. 
We find additional premia for most of the variables that describe the political background of the 
lobbyists on the team. Everything else equal, staffing a lobbying case exclusively with former 
Members of Congress increases its price by about 12 percent. Teams composed of lobbyists with 
Democratic and especially Republican affiliations cost more. The largest premium we observe is 
for lobbyists with past experience in the White House. 
6.B. Lobbyist-Level Analysis 
The report-level analysis above suggests interesting patterns that can be further investigated 
moving to an individual lobbyist analysis. As indicated above, one of the difficulties with the 
report-level analysis is that we cannot zero in on the value added of a specific lobbyist. Hence, 
                                                            
31 The premium is computed per report and thus needs to be further multiplied by the number of reports on which a 
lobbyist typically works on (between 23 and 45 per year on average and assuming that a connected lobbyist works 
on reports where he is connected to a politician that works on an issue in that report) to obtain a yearly connection 




we can only estimate premia at the working team level. For a subset of lobbyists that can be 
observed working with diverse set of co-workers, though, it is possible to estimate fixed effects 
in the dollar amount associated with having their name attached to a lobbying report. 
Specifically, we start with a dataset where the unit of observation is at lobbyist*lobbying report 
level. We define as the dependent variable the logarithm of the total dollar amount associated 
with that lobbying report ln(Vrt) (the same dependent variable as in Table 13, ln(Vrt) is now 
replicated for each lobbyist in the report). We then estimate lobbyist fixed effects in a regression 
that also includes year dummies, a vector of indicator variable for all issues or topics, and non-
parametric controls for the number of lobbyists associated with the report Lrt (e.g. dummies for 
each possible size of the lobbying team). 
Intuitively, it should be clear that such lobbyist fixed effects cannot be estimated for all 
individuals. To fix ideas, consider a pair of lobbyists that always work together. It will be 
impossible to separately estimate separate fixed effects for each of them. Instead, we will only be 
able to compute fixed effects for those lobbyists that we observe as part of changing teams across 
lobbying reports. Because the estimation of such individual fixed effects (and the standard errors 
associated with them) is quite computationally intensive, we for now restrict the sample to 
external lobbyists that are active in at least 6 years over the entire sample period. Furthermore, 
this condition guarantees lower measurement error in the fixed effect estimates.
32 
Once we have computed the lobbyist’s fixed effects, we can then relate them to each lobbyist's 
level of expertise, connections and past professional experience. We do this in Table 14, where 
the unit of observation is a lobbyist and the dependent variable is the estimated lobbyist fixed 
effect derived from the regression outlined above. We estimate median regressions, which allow 
us to better address outlier concerns; we also weigh each observation by the inverse of the 
standard error associated with the estimated fixed effect for that lobbyist/observation further 
accounting for noise in the estimation. 
                                                            
32 For estimating each fixed effect at least six observations are available. For a related discussion Besley and Preston 
(2007) who discuss the issue of consistency of the individual-specific fixed effects in the case of assessing bias of 




Before moving to the regression results, we discuss Figures 2 and 3, which graphically show 
how the distribution of lobbyist fixed effects relate to both their expertise and their level of 
connections. In Figure 2, we see that the distribution of fixed effects for specialists and non-
specialists are almost identical. When we separate lobbyists into those with high (>.33) and low 
issue-based HHI, we find the distribution of fixed effects for the high HHI group to be more 
spread out and with more mass towards low fixed effects compared to the distribution of fixed 
effects for the low HHI group. Hence we observe no premium associated with issue expertise. If 
anything, those lobbyists that concentrate on fewer issues appear to come at a discount. Figure 3 
plots the distributions of lobbyist fixed effects for those with no political connection and those 
with at least one connection (top), as well as for those with 5 connections or more in any given 
Congress and those with less than 5 connections (bottom). In both cases, it is very clear that the 
distribution of fixed effects for those with some or many connections is shifted to the right 
compared to the distribution for those with no or few connections. 
The regression analysis in Table 14 qualitatively confirms the patterns we observed in Figures 3 
and 4. Issue experts do not receive any premium; if anything, a higher level of issue 
concentration carries a discount. 
33  
In contrast, there is a positive and significant premium associated with having more political 
connections through campaign contributions. The premium appears to be especially large for 
those lobbyists that entertain many connections to politicians (6 to 10 percent). Even after 
controlling for connections, we still find a large premium associated with some of the political 
background characteristics. In particular, everything else equal, past experience in the White 
House increases a lobbyist fixed effect by 12 to 15 percent. The premium associated with 
affiliation to the Republican party is larger and more precisely estimated than the premium 
associated with the Democratic party. The estimated coefficient for former Member of Congress 
                                                            
33 This evidence can be reconciled with the report-level results: the fixed effect analysis provides a measure of the 
average return to a specialist, which is revealed to be lower than for non-specialists. This is not in contrast with the 





is quantitatively smaller (2 to 8 percent) and less precisely estimated here than in the report-level 
analysis in Table 13.
34 
6.C. Issue Cycles and Political Cycles 
In this section we perform alternative exercises aimed at measuring whether premia associated to 
issue expertise or to connections change with, respectively, the ‘issue cycle’ and the ‘political 
cycle’. More specifically in our first exercise we ask whether a lobbyist that has affiliation to a 
specific party sees his average return increase as this party moves to a position of power. 
Figure 4 presents evidence that connections to politicians matter for lobbyists’ professional 
activities and particularly for their average revenue. In computing those measures, we assign to 
each lobbyist on the report the average per lobbyist dollar amount on that report Vrlt, aggregate 
over each year and take logs. Figure 4 reports the Republican lobbyist revenue premium in 
percentage terms relative to a Democratic lobbyist (benchmarked at zero) based on total per-
lobbyist per-year amount reported in the SOPR data. Republican lobbyists tally higher revenues 
during Republican Congresses and Republican administrations (up to 30% more during the first 
year of Bush’s second term).
35 The political cycle is not driven by specific issues being more 
likely to be associated to certain parties. Revenue premia are virtually unchanged running the 
specification issue-by-issue in the vast majority of issues. This estimated revenue cycle can be 
attributed to a decrease in the value of connections when political allies are out of office. In this 
sense this result is very much in line with the finding of Blanes-i-Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen 
(2010) that assess a 20% drop in revenues occurring to lobbyists with past experience as 
senatorial aides when their connected Senator leaves office.  
                                                            
34 In regressions not reported here, we also tested for the possibility that expertise might only be valuable when 
combined with connections, a possibility that seemed in keeping with some of the patterns we observed in Table 9. 
We tested for this hypothesis in both the report-level analysis and the lobbyist fixed effect analysis. We did not find 
this interaction term to be economically or statistically significant. 
35 The picture also clearly emphasizes the success of the so-called K-Street Project implemented by the Republican 
party leadership during the first part of the 2000’s. The project was a “database intended to track party affiliation, 
hill experience and political giving of every lobbyist in town.” [Confessore (2003), Welcome to the Machine, 




In Appendix Table A2, we also report, by year, total lobbying expenses associated with lobbyists 
with a Republican affiliation and total expenses associated with lobbyists with a Democratic 
affiliation. We also report, by year, number of active lobbyists with Republican or Democratic 
affiliations. The patterns in this data match political cycles. In particular, the Republican-
Democratic gaps (columns 3 and 6) appear smallest in the very first years of the sample 
(Democratic President) and the last few years (Democratic Congress). Hence, Republican 
(Democratic) lobbyists seem to be professionally more active when political power in 
Washington moves to the right (left). 
In our second exercise we ask whether the average return to an issue-specialist increases in 
periods where that issue becomes more popular and spending on that issue increases overall 
(perhaps because a relevant piece of legislation is being discussed in Congress or at the 
committee level). We construct our measure of issue cycle as follows. Consider the value     of 
report r at time t, and divide it by the number of issues on that report    . This generates an 
average value per issue i on report r,     . Then we sum across all the reports that contain issue i 
at time t,     to obtain    , the total amount spent on issue i at time t: 
           
   
   
 
For each lobbyist l we construct a variable that captures whether the issue in which the lobbyist 
is an expert is booming. Define the set of issues for which lobbyist l is a specialist as    and then 
construct a lobbyist-specific issue cycle measure    : 
          
  
   
 
In Table 15B the dependent variable is the average return for lobbyist l at time t,     (previously 
defined). The results show that the average return to a lobbyist does not seem to respond to an 
expansion, in dollar terms, of the issues in which a lobbyist is specialized. In Table 15A we show 




More specifically the first panel shows that the total number of lobbyists working on a given 
issue increases when the issue expands, while the second panel shows that the share of issue-
specialists declines during an issue boom, hinting to the fact that entry is primarily by non-
experts. This seems to point to relatively low barriers to entry in a specific issue. 
In summary, assuming one takes the analysis in Tables 12, 13, 14, and 15B as evidence of what 
lobbyists' characteristics are most prized, we find weak support to the view that issue expertise is 
what makes a lobbyist “special.” Instead, the lobbyists that appear to earn a premium are those 
that have connections to many politicians and to the ruling political party. At first glance, the 
barriers to entry in establishing connections to politicians of the type we track here appear quite 
low (the average donation to a campaign is just a few thousand dollars). Such low barriers to 
entry seem inconsistent with the view that “connected” lobbyists would maintain a sustainable 
comparative advantage of the magnitude we measure here. What is likely going on is that the 
campaign contributions are a symptom of deeper connections between lobbyists and politicians, 
which cannot as easily be replicated by others. In contrast, it appears that the barriers to entry 
into issue expertise are either indeed quite low (maybe the experts do not need to be the lobbyists 
themselves but can be brought in from industry or academia) or that issue expertise is really not 
necessarily instrumental to “winning” a lobbying case. 
7.  Conclusions 
Our objective in this paper is to provide some guidance on what lobbyists actually do. We were 
motivated by two opposite views of lobbying that have been discussed both in the policy and 
media circles and in the academic literature
36. The first view considers lobbyists as issue experts 
who can contribute valuable information to the law- and rule-making process; the second view 
considers them more as sources of access to lawmakers, because of their personal ties and 
knowledge of those lawmakers. The lively debate surrounding what lobbyists actually do has 
been made particularly relevant by the dramatic growth of the lobbying industry over the last 
decade and their recent prominence as actors in the policy debate during the 2008-09 crisis. 
                                                            




There are also some direct policy implications to this debate when it comes to recent proposals 
and attempts to totally or partially shut the revolving door between jobs on the Hill (or in other 
top government offices) and jobs in lobbying. On the one hand, revolving door lobbyists might 
be those that have the most issue expertise due to their prior experience; on the other hand, 
revolving door lobbyists might be those with the most personal contacts and the most influence 
on lawmakers. 
This paper combines some purely descriptive analysis with some more ambitious attempts to get 
inside the black box of the lobbying process. The main takeaway from our analysis is that a pure 
issue expertise view of lobbying does not fit the data well. Instead, maintaining connections to 
politicians appears central to what lobbyists do. Such connections however need not necessarily 
raise a flag about unethical or illegal practices. We do see evidence of lobbyists' prior knowledge 
and expertise driving whom they decide to connect to, maybe a sign that connections are needed 
for efficient communication between informed lobbyists and time- and attention-constrained 
lawmakers. But we do also see evidence of lobbyists' job assignments being driven by whom 
they know rather what they know. This finding is mirrored in the returns to connections being 
larger than returns to expertise. 
One might wonder whether, even if our results do not support an expertise view of what 
lobbyists do, the evidence is compatible with a scenario in which lobbyists, not experts 
themselves, report to politicians the information produced by expert researchers working for the 
lobbying firm. Such view of lobbyists as mere “messengers” is, we believe, incompatible with 
the large fees assessed for their services. The price tag attached to lobbyists services suggest that 
they bring to the table a complementary resource, perhaps reputation, credibility or political 
savvy, in the transmission of information.
37 We believe the mechanism by which information 
and reputation combine in creating value in the services of lobbyist is intriguing and deserves 
attention in future theoretical research. 
                                                            
37 Birnbaum (2005): “Starting salaries have risen to about $300,000 a year for the best-connected aides eager to 
‘move downtown’[to K street in 2005] from Capitol Hill or the Bush Administration.” [The Road to Riches Is 
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In-house lobbyist 36982 0.416 0.493
Number of lobbying records/year 36982 4.692 9.755
Number of active years 36982 3.898 2.880
Tenure 36982 1.709 1.605
Any biographical information on 
www.lobbyists.info 13720 0.940 0.238
Republican 13720 0.106 0.308
Democrat 13720 0.092 0.289
Former Member of Congress 13720 0.012 0.109
Of wich:
Republican 13720 0.006 0.079
Democrat 13720 0.006 0.074
Senate 13720 0.003 0.056
House 13720 0.010 0.099
Past Experience in/as:
White House 13720 0.023 0.149
Aide 13720 0.110 0.314
Clerk 13720 0.014 0.119
Counsel 13720 0.077 0.267
House (but not as house representative) 13720 0.007 0.082
Senate (but not as senator) 13720 0.103 0.304
Experience in the: 
1960s 13720 0.014 0.116
1970s 13720 0.048 0.213
1980s 13720 0.068 0.251
1990s 13720 0.081 0.273
2000s 13720 0.063 0.243
Table 1: The Lobbyists




Republican Democrat Senator House Rep.
White 
House Aide Clerk Counsel House Senate
Sample: All
1999 0.491 0.118 0.108 0.017 0.008 0.009 0.004 0.015 0.033 0.134 0.019 0.114 0.026 0.130
2000 0.595 0.119 0.109 0.018 0.008 0.009 0.005 0.015 0.030 0.136 0.019 0.110 0.027 0.130
2001 0.563 0.122 0.115 0.018 0.009 0.009 0.004 0.015 0.032 0.139 0.019 0.109 0.027 0.132
2002 0.561 0.122 0.112 0.019 0.010 0.009 0.004 0.016 0.033 0.139 0.016 0.105 0.026 0.131
2003 0.555 0.122 0.113 0.018 0.010 0.008 0.004 0.015 0.032 0.135 0.015 0.101 0.024 0.128
2004 0.556 0.125 0.110 0.016 0.009 0.007 0.003 0.014 0.030 0.136 0.014 0.097 0.022 0.127
2005 0.558 0.128 0.107 0.015 0.008 0.007 0.004 0.013 0.028 0.135 0.013 0.091 0.021 0.127
2006 0.425 0.125 0.104 0.014 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.012 0.027 0.130 0.013 0.088 0.020 0.123
2007 0.359 0.119 0.104 0.013 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.011 0.025 0.125 0.013 0.083 0.019 0.119
2008 0.379 0.114 0.102 0.012 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.010 0.023 0.121 0.012 0.077 0.017 0.114
Sample: External Lobbyists
1999 0.147 0.144 0.026 0.012 0.014 0.006 0.022 0.046 0.173 0.030 0.161 0.039 0.175
2000 0.158 0.166 0.032 0.014 0.017 0.009 0.025 0.047 0.194 0.035 0.184 0.047 0.196
2001 0.160 0.169 0.034 0.017 0.017 0.008 0.028 0.052 0.188 0.034 0.177 0.049 0.192
2002 0.168 0.169 0.034 0.018 0.017 0.008 0.029 0.054 0.192 0.028 0.171 0.046 0.192
2003 0.172 0.167 0.031 0.016 0.015 0.008 0.026 0.051 0.187 0.028 0.164 0.041 0.189
2004 0.176 0.160 0.028 0.014 0.014 0.006 0.024 0.047 0.190 0.026 0.156 0.038 0.190
2005 0.185 0.153 0.026 0.013 0.013 0.007 0.022 0.043 0.187 0.023 0.143 0.036 0.190
2006 0.159 0.131 0.019 0.010 0.009 0.005 0.016 0.036 0.163 0.019 0.120 0.027 0.160
2007 0.146 0.129 0.017 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.014 0.032 0.153 0.017 0.109 0.023 0.150
2008 0.141 0.127 0.015 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.013 0.030 0.148 0.017 0.100 0.022 0.144
Sample: In-House Lobbyists
1999 0.076 0.056 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.015 0.077 0.005 0.047 0.008 0.065
2000 0.084 0.057 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.014 0.084 0.005 0.042 0.008 0.070
2001 0.084 0.062 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.013 0.093 0.005 0.044 0.006 0.075
2002 0.078 0.057 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.012 0.086 0.004 0.041 0.007 0.071
2003 0.074 0.060 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.014 0.083 0.003 0.040 0.008 0.067
2004 0.076 0.063 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.014 0.085 0.003 0.041 0.008 0.067
2005 0.074 0.063 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.013 0.085 0.003 0.040 0.007 0.067
2006 0.070 0.060 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.012 0.075 0.002 0.036 0.010 0.063
2007 0.064 0.055 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.011 0.070 0.003 0.033 0.010 0.059
2008 0.065 0.056 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.011 0.072 0.002 0.033 0.009 0.060
Of Which: Experience in/as:
Table 2: Trends in Lobbyists' Background CharacteristicsYear Specialist Issue-Based HHI
Number of Issues 






1999 0.24 0.33 0.33 0.32 1999 0.17 0.32 0.19 0.23
2000 0.22 0.33 0.29 0.29 2000 0.17 0.32 0.20 0.23
2001 0.22 0.35 0.27 0.25 2001 0.18 0.33 0.21 0.23
2002 0.22 0.34 0.26 0.25 2002 0.19 0.33 0.22 0.23
2003 0.23 0.35 0.28 0.24 2003 0.19 0.34 0.23 0.22
2004 0.23 0.35 0.29 0.24 2004 0.20 0.33 0.23 0.22
2005 0.24 0.35 0.31 0.25 2005 0.20 0.33 0.24 0.22
2006 0.26 0.35 0.34 0.26 2006 0.20 0.33 0.23 0.21
2007 0.28 0.34 0.36 0.27 2007 0.19 0.32 0.22 0.21
2008 0.29 0.34 0.40 0.29 2008 0.19 0.32 0.21 0.21
Across all years 0.25 0.34 0.32 0.27 Across all years 0.19 0.33 0.22 0.22
Year Specialist Issue-Based HHI
Number of Issues 






1999 0.28 0.39 0.35 0.19 1999 0.20 0.28 0.30 0.46
2000 0.29 0.43 0.33 0.09 2000 0.18 0.27 0.26 0.44
2001 0.27 0.43 0.31 0.07 2001 0.18 0.28 0.24 0.39
2002 0.27 0.42 0.30 0.08 2002 0.18 0.28 0.23 0.38
2003 0.27 0.42 0.31 0.07 2003 0.19 0.29 0.26 0.37
2004 0.28 0.42 0.31 0.07 2004 0.19 0.29 0.26 0.37
2005 0.28 0.41 0.31 0.09 2005 0.22 0.30 0.31 0.38
2006 0.28 0.38 0.33 0.15 2006 0.23 0.31 0.34 0.39
2007 0.30 0.37 0.38 0.18 2007 0.22 0.30 0.34 0.42
2008 0.31 0.36 0.39 0.21 2008 0.26 0.30 0.41 0.41
Across all years 0.29 0.40 0.34 0.13 Across all years 0.20 0.29 0.29 0.40
Panel D: In-House Lobbyists
Table 3: Trends in Lobbyists' Expertise
Panel A: All Panel B: At Least 4 Active Years
Panel C: External LobbyistsYear Any  Number Many (>=5) Year Any  Number Many (>=5)
1999 0.22 1.04 0.06 1999 0.29 1.49 0.09
2000 0.22 1.05 0.07 2000 0.28 1.38 0.09
2001 0.24 1.19 0.07 2001 0.28 1.41 0.09
2002 0.24 1.18 0.07 2002 0.27 1.34 0.08
2003 0.30 1.49 0.09 2003 0.33 1.70 0.11
2004 0.30 1.44 0.09 2004 0.33 1.66 0.10
2005 0.28 1.48 0.09 2005 0.32 1.78 0.11
2006 0.27 1.47 0.09 2006 0.34 1.91 0.12
2007 0.32 1.58 0.10 2007 0.39 2.11 0.13
2008 0.29 1.41 0.09 2008 0.39 2.10 0.13
Across all years 0.27 1.34 0.08 Across all years 0.32 1.69 0.11
Year Any Number Many  (>=5) Year Any Number Many  (>=5)
1999 0.31 1.66 0.10 1999 0.13 0.39 0.02
2000 0.35 1.98 0.12 2000 0.14 0.42 0.03
2001 0.36 2.15 0.14 2001 0.15 0.44 0.02
2002 0.37 2.12 0.14 2002 0.15 0.45 0.02
2003 0.44 2.65 0.17 2003 0.19 0.55 0.03
2004 0.43 2.60 0.17 2004 0.19 0.52 0.03
2005 0.42 2.72 0.17 2005 0.16 0.49 0.03
2006 0.37 2.23 0.14 2006 0.15 0.43 0.02
2007 0.39 2.18 0.14 2007 0.19 0.51 0.03
2008 0.36 1.99 0.12 2008 0.18 0.46 0.02
Across all years 0.38 2.21 0.14 Across all years 0.16 0.47 0.03
Table 4: Trends in Lobbyists' Connections (through Campaign Contributions) to Politicians
Panel A: All Panel B: At Least 4 Active Years
Panel C: External Lobbyists Panel D: In-House LobbyistsSample:
Restrict to at Least 4 Active 
Years? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Former Member of 
Congress -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 0.36 0.19 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 0.15 0.18
[0.040] [0.040] [0.042] [0.042] [0.129]** [0.142] [0.028] [0.030] [0.030] [0.031] [0.093] [0.112]
Republican -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 -0.04 -0.04
[0.016]* [0.017]** [0.018]* [0.018]* [0.036] [0.044] [0.012]** [0.013]** [0.013]** [0.014]** [0.026] [0.035]
Democrat -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 -0.03 -0.06
[0.017]** [0.018]** [0.019]** [0.019]** [0.042] [0.051] [0.012]** [0.014]** [0.013]** [0.014]** [0.031] [0.040]
Experience in/as:
House (not rep) 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.27 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.18
[0.048] [0.047] [0.051] [0.049] [0.136] [0.178] [0.034] [0.036] [0.036] [0.036] [0.099] [0.141]
Senate (not senator) -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04
[0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.018]* [0.038] [0.046] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.027] [0.036]
White House -0.09 -0.05 -0.10 -0.06 -0.05 0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 0.02
[0.027]** [0.026]* [0.029]** [0.027]* [0.079] [0.091] [0.019]* [0.020] [0.020]* [0.020]* [0.058] [0.072]
Aide 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.03 0.01
[0.016] [0.016]* [0.018] [0.018]* [0.039] [0.045] [0.011] [0.012] [0.013]** [0.013] [0.028] [0.036]
Clerk 0.05 -0.03 0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.05 -0.12
[0.034] [0.038] [0.035] [0.039] [0.127] [0.179] [0.024] [0.029] [0.025] [0.029] [0.092] [0.141]
Counsel -0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.03
[0.016] [0.016] [0.018]* [0.018] [0.044] [0.052] [0.012] [0.012]* [0.012] [0.013] [0.032] [0.041]
Experience in:
1960s 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.08
[0.036] [0.036]* [0.038] [0.037] [0.124] [0.148] [0.026]** [0.027]** [0.027]** [0.028]* [0.090] [0.117]
1970s -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.08 -0.06
[0.021] [0.021] [0.022] [0.022] [0.068] [0.075] [0.015]* [0.016]* [0.016]* [0.016]* [0.049] [0.059]
1980s -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03
[0.018] [0.018] [0.019] [0.019] [0.055] [0.059] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.014] [0.040] [0.047]
1990s -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.06 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.05
[0.019] [0.019] [0.020] [0.020] [0.051] [0.059] [0.013] [0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.037] [0.047]
2000s 0.05 -0.02 0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.14 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06
[0.020]* [0.021] [0.022]** [0.023] [0.050] [0.061]* [0.014] [0.016] [0.015] [0.017] [0.036] [0.048]
R-Squared 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01
Observations 13,720            8,004            9,325            5,788             4,395          2,216           13,720          8,004             9,325              5,788             4,395             2,216            
The regressions also include an "experience" dummy.
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 5: Determinants of Lobbyists' Expertise
Dependent Variable: Issue-Based HHI
All External In-House All External In-House
Dependent Variable: Specialist (Y=1)Sample:
Restrict to at Least 4 
Active Years? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Former Memb of 
Congress 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.15 0.05 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.04
[0.041]** [0.048]* [0.044]* [0.049] [0.124] [0.174] [0.024]** [0.032]** [0.029]** [0.038]** [0.036]** [0.049]
Republican 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.18 0.15 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.05
[0.017]** [0.021]** [0.019]** [0.022]** [0.035]** [0.054]** [0.010]** [0.014]** [0.012]** [0.017]** [0.010]** [0.015]**
Democrat 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.02 0.02
[0.018]** [0.022]** [0.020]** [0.023]** [0.041]* [0.063]* [0.010]** [0.014]** [0.013]** [0.017]** [0.012] [0.018]
Experience in/as:
House (not rep) 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.05 -0.08 -0.10 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 -0.02 -0.04
[0.049]* [0.057] [0.053] [0.058] [0.131] [0.219] [0.029]* [0.038]* [0.035]* [0.044] [0.038] [0.062]
Senate (not senator) 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.01 0.00
[0.016]** [0.020]** [0.018]** [0.021]** [0.036] [0.056]* [0.009]** [0.013]** [0.012]** [0.016]** [0.011] [0.016]
White House 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.23 0.26 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.03
[0.028]** [0.032]** [0.030]** [0.032]** [0.076]** [0.112]* [0.016]** [0.021]** [0.020]** [0.025]** [0.022]** [0.032]
Aide 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
[0.017]* [0.020] [0.018]* [0.021] [0.037] [0.055] [0.010] [0.013] [0.012] [0.016] [0.011] [0.016]
Clerk 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
[0.035] [0.047] [0.036] [0.046] [0.122] [0.219] [0.020] [0.031] [0.024] [0.036] [0.035] [0.062]
Counsel 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
[0.017]** [0.020]** [0.018]** [0.021]** [0.042]* [0.064] [0.010]** [0.013]* [0.012] [0.016] [0.012] [0.018]
Experience in:
1960s 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.07
[0.038] [0.043] [0.040] [0.044] [0.120] [0.182] [0.022]** [0.029]** [0.026]** [0.034]** [0.035] [0.051]
1970s 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.01
[0.022]** [0.025]** [0.023]** [0.025]** [0.065] [0.092] [0.013]** [0.017]* [0.015]** [0.020] [0.019] [0.026]
1980s 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 -0.02 0.00
[0.019]** [0.021]** [0.020]** [0.022]** [0.053] [0.073] [0.011]** [0.014]** [0.013]** [0.017]* [0.015] [0.020]
1990s 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.01
[0.019]** [0.023]** [0.021]** [0.023]** [0.050] [0.073] [0.011]** [0.015]* [0.014]** [0.018] [0.014] [0.021]
2000s -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
[0.020]* [0.026] [0.022]* [0.027] [0.048] [0.075] [0.012] [0.017] [0.015] [0.021] [0.014] [0.021]
R-squared 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.01
Observations 13,720 8,004 9,325 5,788 4,395 2,216 13,720 8,004 9,325 5,788 4,395 2,216
The regressions also include an experience dummy and a constant.
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 6: Determinants of Lobbyists' Connections to Politicians (through Campaign Contributions)
Dependent Variable: Any Connection? (Y=1) Dependent Variable: Many (>=5) Connections? (Y=1)
All External In-House All External  In-HouseCongress:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Republican Congressman  -0.001 -0.001 -0.0002 -0.0002
[0.0001]** [0.0001]** [0.0001]* [0.0001]*
Republican Lobbyist -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
[0.0003]** [0.0003]** [0.0003]** [0.0003]**
Republican Congressman*Republican Lobbyist 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007
[0.0006]** [0.0006]** [0.0006]** [0.0006]** [0.0006]** [0.0006]**
Democratic Lobbyist 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.008
[0.0008]** [0.0008]** [0.0008]** [0.0008]**
Republican Congressman*Democratic Lobbyist -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
[0.0008]** [0.0008]** [0.0008]** [0.0007]** [0.0007]** [0.0007]**
Senator 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002
[0.0002]** [0.0002]** [0.0001]** [0.0001]**
Lobbyist Has Senate Experience -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0002
[0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004]
Lobbyist Has House Experience 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007
[0.0020]** [0.0020]** [0.0022]** [0.0022]**
Senator*Lobbyist Has Senate Experience 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009
[0.0009]** [0.0009]** [0.0009]** [0.0009]** [0.0009]** [0.0009]**
House Representative*Lobbyist Has House Experience -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
[0.0015]* [0.0015]* [0.0015]* [0.0017]* [0.0017]* [0.0017]*
Congressman Fixed Effects No Yes No No Yes No
Lobbyist Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
R-squared 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02
Observations 4,575,967           4,575,967      4,575,967       3,979,756         3,979,756         3,979,756        
Standard errors are clustered at the lobbyist level.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
108th 107th
Table 7: Who Makes Campaign Contributions to Whom?
The Role of Party and House/Senate Links
Dependent Variable: Lobbyist Makes at Least One Campaign Contribution to that Legislator in that CongressCongress
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lobbyist made at least one campaign contribution to that 
Congressman in Congress (t)? (Y=1) 0.913 0.435 0.029 0.019 1.023 0.400 0.024 0.017
[0.0531]** [0.0261]** [0.0024]** [0.0031]** [0.0670]** [0.0361]** [0.0027]** [0.0039]**
Republican Lobbyist 0.576 0.014 0.519 0.011
[0.0538]** [0.0018]** [0.0616]** [0.0018]**
Republican Congressman*Republican Lobbyist 0.032 0.036 0.001 0.001 0.019 0.023 0.002 0.002
[0.0032]** [0.0032]** [0.0002]** [0.0002]** [0.0028]** [0.0028]** [0.0003]** [0.0003]**
Democratic Lobbyist 0.452 0.014 0.521 0.013
[0.0542]** [0.0019]** [0.0641]** [0.0018]**
Republican Congressman*Democratic Lobbyist 0.043 0.038 0.001 0.001 0.037 0.031 0.002 0.002
[0.0036]** [0.0034]** [0.0002]** [0.0002]** [0.0034]** [0.0031]** [0.0003]** [0.0003]**
Lobbyist Has Senate Experience 0.045 0.004 0.088 0.003
[0.0513] [0.0023] [0.0589] [0.0022]
Senator*Lobbyist has Senate Experience 0.299 0.304 -0.014 -0.014 0.326 0.331 -0.012 -0.012
[0.0334]** [0.0336]** [0.0020]** [0.0020]** [0.0383]** [0.0384]** [0.0020]** [0.0020]**
Lobbyist Has House Experience 0.312 -0.009 0.205 -0.008
[0.1726] [0.0010]** [0.1767] [0.0010]**
House Representative*Lobbyist has House Experience -0.277 -0.279 0.010 0.010 -0.228 -0.230 0.010 0.010
[0.0781]** [0.0782]** [0.0046]* [0.0046]* [0.0795]** [0.0798]** [0.0042]* [0.0042]*
Republican Congressman  0.083 0.019 0.056 0.048
[0.0010]** [0.0001]** [0.0008]** [0.0001]**
Senator 0.828 -0.102 0.850 -0.101
[0.0102]** [0.0007]** [0.0115]** [0.0007]**
Constant 1.0338 0.9766 0.1116 0.1235 1.049 1.0088 0.1386 0.1342
[0.0138]** [0.0027]** [0.0006]** [0.0002]** [0.0152]** [0.0030]** [0.0006]** [0.0001]**
R-squared 0.21 0.42 0.76 0.04 0.23 0.39 0.81 0.03
Observations 4,575,967 4,575,967 4,575,967 4,575,967 3,979,756 3,979,756 3,979,756 3,979,756
Lobbyist F.E.s No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Congressman F.E.s Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Standard errors are clustered at the lobbyist level.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
107th
Table 8: Do Connections through Campaign Contributions Predict Overlapping Issues between Lobbyists and Congressmen?
Lobbyist Works on All the 
Issues Covered by the 
Legislator in Congress (t)  
(Y=1)
Lobbyist Works on All the 
Issues Covered by the 
Legislator in Congress (t)  
(Y=1)
Number of Issues Covered by the 
Legislator in Congress (t) that the 
Lobbyists Covers in Congress (t)
Number of Issues Covered by the 
Legislator in Congress (t) that the 
Lobbyists Covers in Congress (t)
108thSample:
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Lobbyist made at least one campaign contribution to that 
Congressman in Congress (t)? (Y=1) 0.0373 0.0317 0.039 0.0057 0.0604 0.0256 0.034 0.0302 0.0202 0.0163
[0.0093]** [0.0025]** [0.0028]** [0.0034] [0.0066]** [0.0024]** [0.0027]** [0.0031]** [0.0025]** [0.0027]**
Congressman F.E.s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.8 0.76 0.52 0.8 0.77 0.76
Observations 74,752 4,509,064 2,310,888 2,272,928 1,129,456 3,454,360 784,900 3,798,916 602,104 3,981,712
Sample: External Lobbyist?
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Lobbyist made at least one campaign contribution to that 
Congressman in Congress (t)? (Y=1) 0.0337 0.0252 0.0312 0.0057 0.0549 0.0185 0.0245 0.0277 0.0135 0.0125
[0.0087]** [0.0028]** [0.0030]** [0.0044] [0.0068]** [0.0028]** [0.0029]** [0.0034]** [0.0026]** [0.0033]**
Congressman F.E.s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.84 0.81 0.73 0.82 0.81 0.81
Observations 74,054 3,925,469 2,027,987 1,971,536 943,885 3,055,638 494,175 3,505,348 452,822 3,546,701
Standard errors are clustered at the lobbyist level.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Lobbyist is a Former 
Member of Congress?
Lobbyist is a 
Specialist?
Congressman is 
connected to at least 
40 Lobbyists?
Lobbyist is Connected 





Table 9: Do Connections through Campaign Contributions Predict Overlapping Issues between Lobbyists and Congressmen?
Heterogeneity of Effect Across Lobbyists and Congressmen
Dependent Variable: Lobbyist Works on All the Issues Covered by the Legislator in Congress (t)  (Y=1)
Lobbyist is a Former 
Member of Congress?
Lobbyist is a 
Specialist?
Congressman is 
connected to at least 
40 Lobbyists?
Lobbyist is Connected 
to at least 5 Members 
of Congress?(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lobbyists made at least one campaign 
contribution to that Congressman in 
Congress (t)? (Y=1) 0.359 0.342 0.118 0.201 0.188 0.100 0.106 0.306
[0.046]** [0.047]** [0.043]** [0.046]** [0.044]** [0.033]** [0.033]** [0.057]**
Number of new issues for the legislator in 
Congress (t+1) that the Lobbyist covers in 
Congress (t)  0.64 0.6 0.587 0.677 0.676 0.638 0.637
[0.009]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.013]** [0.013]** [0.008]** [0.008]**
Specialist -0.249 -0.255 -0.245
[0.033]** [0.054]** [0.055]**
Internal 0.063 -0.008 0.044
[0.021]** [0.025] [0.028]
Number of active congresses 0.21
[0.007]**
Average Lobbyist Revenue 0.00001
[0.000]**
Lobbyist is Former Congressman 0.112
[0.086]
Number of issues covered by the legislator 
in Congress (t) that the Lobbyists covers in 
Congress (t) -0.007
[0.001]**
Interactions Party Affiliat. * Party in Power 
(Full Set) No No No No Yes No No No
Congress F.E.s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lobbyist F.E.s No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Congressman F.E.s No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
Lobbyists.Info Sample No No No Yes Yes No No No
Constant 0.025 0.137 -0.688 0.185 0.124 0.53 0.571 1.883
[0.019] [0.020]** [0.036]** [0.031]** [0.034]** [0.028]** [0.028]** [0.019]**
R-squared 0.57 0.58 0.6 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.18
Observations 513,000 513,000 513,000 265,938 265,351 513,000 513,000 513,000
Sample is restricted to Congressmen that switch committee assignments between two consecutive Congresses.
Standard errors are clustered at the lobbyist level. For computational reasons for each politician a sample of the 1000 closest lobbyists is considered.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 10a: Do Lobbyists Follow Politicians They Are Connected to as Those Politicians Switch Committee Assignments?
Dependent Variable: Number of new issues for the legislator in Congress (t+1) that the Lobbyists covers in Congress (t+1) Sample:
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Lobbyists made at least one 
campaign contribution to that 
Congressman in Congress 
(t)? (Y=1) 0.028 0.105 0.101 0.175 0.104 0.04 0.106 0.115 0.094 0.046
[0.106] [0.034]** [0.034]** [0.109] [0.038]** [0.053] [0.043]* [0.043]** [0.023]** [0.184]
Number of new issues for the 
legislator in Congress (t+1) that 
the Lobbyist covers in Congress 
(t)  0.486 0.648 0.633 0.646 0.64 0.632 0.621 0.64 0.603 0.271
[0.035]** [0.008]** [0.011]** [0.012]** [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.010]** [0.008]** [0.007]** [0.019]**
Number of issues covered by 
the legislator in Congress (t) 
that the Lobbyists covers in 
Congress (t) -0.01 -0.006 -0.009 0 -0.011 -0.004 -0.015 -0.004 -0.002 -0.1
[0.003]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001] [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.009]**
Congress F.E.s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lobbyist F.E.s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.556 0.572 0.58 0.548 0.564 0.596 0.691 0.535 0.446 4.892
[0.091]** [0.029]** [0.042]** [0.034]** [0.028]** [0.030]** [0.031]** [0.029]** [0.017]** [0.186]**
R-squared 0.59 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.63 0.79
Observations 40,635 472,365 263,639 249,361 267,000 246,000 120,000 393,000 461,000 52,000
Sample is restricted to Congressmen that switch committee assignments between two consecutive Congresses.
Standard errors are clustered at the lobbyist level. For computational reasons for each politician a sample of the 1000 closest lobbyists is considered.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 10b: Heterogeneity in Following Connected Politicians.
Dependent Variable: Number of new issues for the legislator in Congress (t+1) that the Lobbyists covers in Congress (t+1)
Lobbyist is a 
Specialist? External Lobbyist?
Congressman is 
connected to at least 
40 Lobbyists?
Congressman is a 
Senator?
Congressman moves 
into fewer than 20 
new issues?(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lobbyists made at least one campaign 
contribution to that Congressman in 
Congress (t)? (Y=1) 0.52 0.331 0.319 0.296 0.403 0.23 0.165 0.097
[0.046]** [0.042]** [0.056]** [0.030]** [0.034]** [0.033]** [0.037]** [0.025]**
Number of issues for the legislator in 
Congress (t+1) that the Lobbyist is already 
covering in Congress (t)  0.598 0.553 0.634 0.497 0.667 0.631 0.753 0.536
[0.007]** [0.006]** [0.009]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.004]**
Specialist -0.187 -0.311 -0.097 -0.216
[0.009]** [0.015]** [0.007]** [0.010]**
Internal 0.021 0.014 -0.121 -0.05
[0.010]* [0.016] [0.008]** [0.011]**
Number of active congresses 0.172 0.141
[0.003]** [0.003]**
Average Lobbyist Revenue 0.0001 0.0001
[0.000]** [0.000]*
Lobbyist is Former Congressman 0.061 -0.054
[0.091] [0.052]
Interactions Party Affiliat. * Party in Power 
(Full Set) No No Yes No No No Yes No
Congress F.E.s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lobbyist F.E.s No No No Yes No No No Yes
Congressman F.E.s Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Constant 0.238 -0.319 0.402 0.477 0.18 -0.236 0.334 0.476
[0.006]** [0.012]** [0.015]** [0.010]** [0.004]** [0.012]** [0.010]** [0.008]**
R-squared 0.43 0.48 0.51 0.67 0.47 0.5 0.57 0.7
Observations 1,892,714 1,892,714 754,462 1,892,714 1,923,920 1,923,920 980,748 1,923,920
Sample is restricted to 106 and 107 Congresses and 108 and 109 separately for computational reasons.
Standard errors are clustered at the lobbyist level.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 10c: Do Lobbyists Follow Freshmen They Are Connected to as Those Politicians Are Elected and Gain Committee Assignments?
Dependent Variable: Number of issues for the legislator in Congress (t+1) that the Lobbyists covers in Congress (t+1)
Congresses 106-107 Congresses 108-109Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Sample: All All All
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Number of issues covered by the 
legislator in Congress (t+1) that the 
Lobbyists covers in Congress (t) 0.6882 0.6510 0.5926 0.6282 0.5893 1.0569 0.1821 2.1665 0.8904 0.8188 0.1616
[0.04591]** [0.04949]** [0.04219]** [0.12558]** [0.04483]** [0.08654]** [0.02113]** [0.71017]** [0.07033]** [0.0618]** [0.0426]**
Lobbyist made at least one campaign 
contribution to that Congressman in 
Congress (t)? (Y=1) 0.2769 0.2762 0.2620 0.2992 0.2492 0.2723 0.2204 0.2951 0.2792 0.2432 0.3035
[0.0058]** [0.0058]** [0.0058]** [0.0117]** [0.0066]** [0.0065]** [0.0124]** [0.0298]** [0.0071]** [0.0062]** [0.012]**
Number of issues covered by the 
legislator in Congress (t) that the 
Lobbyists covers in Congress (t) 0.1115 0.1393 0.0096 0.1228 -0.0009 -0.0605 0.0628 -1.0607 -0.0460 -0.2485 0.0287
[0.03511]** [0.03800]** [0.03541] [0.11847] [0.03711] [0.07488] [0.02085]** [0.72557] [0.05787] [0.0543]** [0.0423]
Congress F.E.s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Congressmen F.E.s No Yes No No No No No No No No No
Lobbyist F.E.s No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.11
Observations 3,758,268       3,758,268       3,758,268       1,073,836      2,684,432       1,673,233      2,085,035       30,020        1,687,709      2,030,424       1,727,844     
Sample is restricted to Congressmen that switch committee assignments between 107 and 108 Congresses for computational reasons.
Standard errors are clustered at the lobbyist level. Coefficients and s.e. for number of issues covered by the legislator in Congress (t+1) and (t) that the Lobbyists covers in Congress (t) are (x1000).
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Lobbyist is a Former 
Member of Congress? Lobbyist is a Specialist?
Congressman is 
connected to at least 40 
Lobbyists?
Table 11: Do Lobbyists Establish Connections (though Campaign Contributions) to Politicians as the Politicians are Assigned to the Lobbyists' Area of Expertise?
External Lobbyist?








1999 1,650,000,000 $         37% 14% 22% 13% 28%
2000 1,760,000,000 $         37% 13% 19% 12% 29%
2001 1,820,000,000 $         38% 14% 19% 11% 30%
2002 2,040,000,000 $         37% 14% 18% 11% 30%
2003 2,430,000,000 $         42% 17% 18% 10% 34%
2004 2,420,000,000 $         45% 18% 20% 11% 36%
2005 2,850,000,000 $         43% 18% 21% 11% 34%
2006 3,300,000,000 $         44% 17% 20% 11% 35%
2007 3,360,000,000 $         47% 19% 23% 12% 37%
2008 3,040,000,000 $         42% 16% 24% 15% 33%
1999 909,000,000 $            48% 21% 24% 13% 36%
2000 698,000,000 $            57% 27% 27% 13% 42%
2001 777,000,000 $            58% 29% 27% 12% 43%
2002 856,000,000 $            57% 27% 26% 12% 43%
2003 1,060,000,000 $         65% 34% 26% 11% 50%
2004 1,130,000,000 $         65% 34% 28% 12% 48%
2005 1,330,000,000 $         63% 35% 28% 12% 47%
2006 2,090,000,000 $         56% 25% 23% 11% 43%
2007 2,330,000,000 $         56% 25% 26% 12% 42%
2008 1,910,000,000 $         54% 24% 26% 13% 41%
Table 12: Dollar Shares Across Lobbyists' Types
Full Sample Shares
External Lobbyists Only Shares
Notes: Shares of total lobbying amount reported by different types of lobbyists.(1) (2) (3)
At Least One Specialist Matching an Issue 0.033 0.035 0.051
[0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]**
At Least One Connection to a Politician Covering an Issue 0.08 0.097 0.087
[0.004]** [0.004]** [0.005]**
Average Tenure 0.001 -0.01 -0.01
[0.002] [0.002]** [0.002]**
Average Number of Active Years 0.008 0.023 0.025
[0.001]** [0.002]** [0.002]**
Average Number of Reports Per Lobbyist -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
[0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]**






Share with Experience in/as: [0.007]**
House (but not as house representatives) 0.016
[0.016]










Any Distinctive Experience -0.136
[0.011]**
Fixed Effects for:
Number of Lobbyists Included on the Report Yes Yes Yes
Report Type Yes Yes Yes
Issues covered by the report Yes Yes Yes
Year of Report Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.25 0.25 0.26
Observations 191,240 165,885 165,885
Clustered standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Also included are dummies for lobbyists' experience in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s.
Any dinstinctive experience indicates any experience detail reported in the Lobbyists.info records.
Table 13: Valuing Expertise and Connections - Lobbying Report Analysis
External Lobbying Only
Dependent Variable: Log (Amount)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Issue-Based HHI -0.233 -0.227 -0.218 -0.231 -0.214 -0.218
[0.026]** [0.029]** [0.027]** [0.023]** [0.025]** [0.029]**
Specialist -0.012 -0.016 -0.005 -0.02 -0.027 -0.009
[0.017] [0.019] [0.022] [0.017] [0.021] [0.020]
At Least One Connection 0.07 0.03 0.009 0.095 0.062 0.043
[0.017]** [0.020] [0.019] [0.016]** [0.019]** [0.022]
At Least Five Connections 0.076 0.073 0.055 0.098 0.094 0.073
[0.016]** [0.017]** [0.019]** [0.017]** [0.020]** [0.020]**
Number of Active Years -0.014 -0.012 -0.006 -0.018 -0.017 -0.009 -0.01 -0.008 -0.005 -0.014 -0.013 -0.006
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007]* [0.007]* [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008]
Tenure 0.031 0.04 0.033 0.045 0.045 0.036 0.03 0.033 0.026 0.042 0.044 0.031
[0.016] [0.017]* [0.015]* [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.016]* [0.015]* [0.017]* [0.019] [0.015]** [0.018]* [0.017]
Former Memb. Of Congress 0.017 0.036 0.085 0.052
[0.048] [0.050] [0.058] [0.053]
Republican 0.039 0.032 0.061 0.071
[0.024] [0.025] [0.028]* [0.026]**
Democrat 0.034 0.03 0.046 0.053
[0.025] [0.026] [0.029] [0.027]*
Experience in/as:
House (but not as House Rep.) -0.012 -0.024 -0.001 0.016
[0.061] [0.064] [0.074] [0.067]
Senate (but not as Senator) 0.019 0.016 0.02 0.013
[0.022] [0.023] [0.027] [0.024]
White House 0.133 0.119 0.127 0.145
[0.034]** [0.036]** [0.041]** [0.038]**
Aide -0.048 -0.045 -0.03 -0.03
[0.022]* [0.023] [0.027] [0.024]
Clerk 0.108 0.133 0.103 0.11
[0.047]* [0.049]** [0.057] [0.052]*
Counsel 0.036 0.033 0.044 0.043
[0.022] [0.023] [0.026] [0.024]
Any Distinctive Experience -0.071 -0.04 -0.067 -0.063
[0.038] [0.040] [0.046] [0.042]
Constant 15.055 15.027 15.064 15.067 15.052 15.044 14.928 14.924 14.959 14.964 14.953 14.968
[0.040]** [0.046]** [0.056]** [0.035]** [0.039]** [0.059]** [0.036]** [0.043]** [0.066]** [0.036]** [0.046]** [0.060]**
Observations 3,926 2,830 2,830 3,926 2,830 2,830 3,926 2,830 2,830 3,926 2,830 2,830
Median regressions, Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Each observation is weighted by the inverse of the standard error on the estimated fixed effects we use as dependent variable.
Also included are dummies for lobbyists' experience in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s.
Any dinstinctive experience indicates any experience detail reported in the Lobbyists.info records.
Table 14: Valuing Expertise and Connections - Lobbyist-Level Analysis
External Lobbyists with at least 6 Years of Active Experience Only
Dependent Variable: Lobbyist's Estimated Fixed Effect Log total lobbyists in issue Log total lobbyists in issue
(1) (2)
 Log total amount in issue 0.501
[0.062]**
Log total amount in issue 0.491
[0.066]**
Issue Specific Trend No Yes
Issue F.E.s No Yes
Observations 684 760
R-squared 0.49 0.98
 share specialists in issue Share specialists in issue
 Log total amount in issue -0.021
[0.007]**
Log total amount in issue -0.022
[0.006]**
Issue Specific Trend No Yes
Issue F.E.s No Yes
Observations 684 760
R-squared 0.07 0.74
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Log per Lobbyist 
Amount
Log per Lobbyist 
Amount
(1) (2)
i [Total amount in issue i *Specialist in issue i] 0.000035
[0.000097]
i [Log total amount in issue i *Specialist in issue i] -4254.96
[9040.62]
Year F.E.s Yes Yes
Lobbyist F.E.s Yes Yes
Observations 144,137 144,137
R-squared 0.48 0.48
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Standard errors are clustered at the issue level.
Table 15b: Issue Booms and Expertise - Lobbyist Analysis
Dependent Variable
Table 15a: Issue Booms and Expertise - Issue Analysis
Dependent Variable
Dependent Variable
Standard errors are clustered at the issue level.Figure 1A: Distribution of the Share of Specialists Across Lobbying Organizations

















kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0575
Kernel density estimate
Note: :"External" refers to external lobbying; "Internal" refers to in-house lobbying. We restrict the sample 

































kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0541
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F.E. External lobbyist active for at least 6 years
HHI>.3
HHI<=.3




Note: Lobbyists fixed effects were only computed for external lobbyists that are active in at least 6 out 
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F.E. External lobbyist active for at least 6 years
HHI>.3
HHI<=.3



















13 14 15 16 17 18
F.E. External lobbyist active for at least 6 years
Specialist==1
Specialist==0
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0879
Kernel density estimateFigure 3: Distribution of External Lobbyists' Estimated Value Added By Level of Connections 
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F.E. External lobbyist active for at least 6 years
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5 Kernel density estimate
Note: Lobbyists fixed effects were only computed for external lobbyists that are active in at least 6 out 
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F.E. External lobbyist active for at least 6 years
Any Connection==1
Any Connection==0
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F.E. External lobbyist active for at least 6 years
Many Connections==1
Many Connections==0
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0798













1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Year
% GOP Revenue premium 5% Confidence band
Democratic Benchmark
Republican lobbying revenue premium (per lobbyist)Year Internal External All
1999 1098 900 1994
2000 1291 766 2055
2001 1233 841 2072
2002 1372 917 2288
2003 1568 1098 2665
2004 1443 1141 2584
2005 1638 1303 2941
2006 1526 1776 3303
2007 1118 2145 3263
2008 1122 1726 2847
Notes: All figures are in millions of 2006 dollars.
Appendix Table A1: Trends in Total Lobbying ExpensesYear
Republican Democratic  Gap Republican Democratic  Gap 
1999 127.84 113.86 13.98 589 530 59
2000 157.64 122.94 34.70 619 556 63
2001 167.53 152.00 15.53 659 614 45
2002 201.22 168.73 32.49 711 646 65
2003 262.22 209.42 52.80 795 722 73
2004 305.84 212.25 93.59 881 766 115
2005 373.71 263.05 110.66 1022 848 174
2006 521.13 293.00 228.13 1110 920 190
2007 449.21 370.07 79.14 1178 1029 149
2008 368.94 404.62 -35.69 1230 1097 133
Lobbying expenses are in millions of dollars.
Appendix Table A2: Political Cycles and Republican and Democratic Lobbyists






Cassidy & Assoc. Boylan, John Senior Vice President aerospace 0 1 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Cassidy, Gerald S. J.
Founder & Executive 
Chairman aerospace 1 0 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Edwards, Shawn
Vice President and Deputy 
Director of Cassidy Defense aerospace 0 0 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Hegarty,Mark Senior Vice President aerospace 0 1 1
Cassidy & Assoc. McNamara, Dan Executive Vice President aerospace 0 0 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Meyers, George Vice President aerospace 0 1 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Paul, Terry
Executive Vice President 
and Director of Defense 
Group aerospace 0 1 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Russo, Marty
Senior Vice Chairman & 
Chief Executive Officer aerospace 1 0 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Simmons, Vernon Vice President aerospace 0 1 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Videnieks, Markus Vice President aerospace 0 0 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Anderson, Kai Executive Vice President
energy efficiency, power 
storage, green buildings0 1 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Burlij, Emily Associate
energy efficiency, power 
storage, green buildings1 0 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Crespo, Jacqueline Senior Associate
energy efficiency, power 
storage, green buildings0 1 0
Cassidy & Assoc. Dennis, Tom Executive Vice President
energy efficiency, power 
storage, green buildings0 0 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Anderson, Kai Executive Vice President nuclear power 01 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Burlij, Emily Associate nuclear power 10 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Crespo, Jacqueline Senior Associate nuclear power 01 0
Cassidy & Assoc. Dennis, Tom Executive Vice President nuclear power 00 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Anderson, Kai Executive Vice President technology 01 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Boylan, John Senior Vice President technology 01 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Chapman, Justin Account Coordinator technology 00 0
Cassidy & Assoc. Crespo, Jacqueline Senior Associate technology 01 0
Cassidy & Assoc. Dennis, Tom Executive Vice President technology 00 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Edwards, Shawn
Vice President and Deputy 
Director of Cassidy Defense technology 00 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Hartley, Gregg L.
Vice Chairman & Chief 
Operating Officer technology 00 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Hegarty,Mark Senior Vice President technology 01 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Hochstein, Amos
Executive Vice President for 
International Operations technology 00 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Ide, Betsy Vice President technology 00 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Levy, Dawn Senior Vice President technology 00 1
Cassidy & Assoc. McNamara, Dan Executive Vice President technology 00 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Meyers, George Vice President technology 01 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Neal, Laura Senior Vice President technology 00 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Paul, Terry
Executive Vice President 
and Director of Defense 
Group technology 01 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Russo, Marty
Senior Vice Chairman & 
Chief Executive Officer technology 10 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Simmons, Vernon Vice President technology 01 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Sutton, Barbara Executive Vice President technology 00 1
Cassidy & Assoc. Temple, Roy Senior Vice President technology 10 1
Patton Boggs LLP Chambers, Scott  Partner  biotechnology 11 0
Patton Boggs LLP Chism, B. Dell  Patent Agent biotechnology 01 0
Patton Boggs LLP McKeague, W. John  Associate  biotechnology 11 0






Patton Boggs LLP Bell, Chris  Of Counsel  clean technology 10 1
Patton Boggs LLP Chajet, Henry  Partner  clean technology 10 1
Patton Boggs LLP Driver, Michael  Partner  clean technology 10 1
Patton Boggs LLP Farber, David  Partner  clean technology 10 1
Patton Boggs LLP Forest, Carl  Partner  clean technology 11 0
Patton Boggs LLP Frank, Michele  Partner  clean technology 10 0
Patton Boggs LLP Graziano, James  Partner  clean technology 11 0
Patton Boggs LLP Greene, Joshua  Partner  clean technology 10 1
Patton Boggs LLP Harris, Laurence  Senior Counsel  clean technology 10 1
Patton Boggs LLP Horn, Robert  Partner  clean technology 10 1
Patton Boggs LLP Johnson, Gregory  Partner  clean technology 10 0
Patton Boggs LLP Kelly, Suedeen  Partner  clean technology 10 0
Patton Boggs LLP Mayer, David  Partner  clean technology 10 0
Patton Boggs LLP McIntosh, Carolyn  Partner  clean technology 10 1
Patton Boggs LLP Passaic, Joseph  Partner  clean technology 10 0
Patton Boggs LLP Ryan, Deborah  Partner  clean technology 10 0
Patton Boggs LLP Savit, Mark  Partner  clean technology 10 1
Patton Boggs LLP Stewart, Scott  Partner  clean technology 10 0
Patton Boggs LLP Witt, Kenneth  Partner  clean technology 10 0
Patton Boggs LLP Chambers, Scott  Partner  drugs/biologics 1 1 0
Patton Boggs LLP Herbert, Toni-Junell  Partner  drugs/biologics 1 1 0
Patton Boggs LLP Nuttall, Carey  Associate  drugs/biologics 1 0 0
Patton Boggs LLP Pape, Stuart  Partner  drugs/biologics 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Rubin, Paul  Partner  drugs/biologics 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Shanks, Mark  Partner  drugs/biologics 1 1 1
Patton Boggs LLP Nuttall, Carey  Associate 
medical devices and 
diagnostics 1 0 0
Patton Boggs LLP Pape, Stuart  Partner 
medical devices and 
diagnostics 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Rubin, Paul  Partner 
medical devices and 
diagnostics 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Kelly, Suedeen  Partner  nuclear 10 0
Patton Boggs LLP Lessy, Roy  Partner  nuclear 10 1
Patton Boggs LLP Allard, Nicholas  Partner  smart grid 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Arbuckle, J. Gordon  Partner  smart grid 1 0 0
Patton Boggs LLP Barton, Betty  Public Policy Advisor  smart grid 0 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Besozzi, Paul  Partner  smart grid 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Cetta, Jennifer  Associate  smart grid 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Didden, Carly  Associate  smart grid 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Driver, Michael  Partner  smart grid 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Ellison, Mark  Partner  smart grid 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Farber, David  Partner  smart grid 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Greene, Joshua  Partner  smart grid 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Johnson, Gregory  Partner  smart grid 1 0 0
Patton Boggs LLP Jolivert, Meredith  Associate  smart grid 1 0 0
Patton Boggs LLP Kelly, Suedeen  Partner  smart grid 1 0 0
Patton Boggs LLP Krayem, Norma  Senior Policy Advisor  smart grid 0 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Lodge, Deborah  Partner  smart grid 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Martin, Kevin  Partner  smart grid 1 0 0
Patton Boggs LLP McIntosh, Carolyn  Partner  smart grid 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Moran, Janet  Partner  smart grid 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Richter, Jennifer  Partner  smart grid 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Talesnick, Alan  Partner  smart grid 1 0 0
Patton Boggs LLP Turner, Jeffrey  Partner  smart grid 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Voorhees, John  Partner  smart grid 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP White, Eric  Partner  smart grid 1 0 0
Patton Boggs LLP Allard, Nicholas  Partner 
technology and 
communications 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Berry, Matthew  Partner 
technology and 
communications 1 0 0
Patton Boggs LLP Besozzi, Paul  Partner 
technology and 
communications 1 0 1






Patton Boggs LLP Bright, William  Public Policy Advisor 
technology and 
communications 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Cetta, Jennifer  Associate 
technology and 
communications 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Desai, Monica  Partner 
technology and 
communications 1 0 0
Patton Boggs LLP Didden, Carly  Associate 
technology and 
communications 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Ellison, Mark  Partner 
technology and 
communications 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Forest, Carl  Partner 
technology and 
communications 1 1 0
Patton Boggs LLP Gavin, Stephen Diaz  Partner 
technology and 
communications 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Graziano, James  Partner 
technology and 
communications 1 1 0
Patton Boggs LLP Hager, Robert  Partner 
technology and 
communications 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Harris, Laurence  Senior Counsel 
technology and 
communications 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Ireland, Kathleen  Public Policy Counselor 
technology and 
communications 0 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Kim, Hwan  Partner 
technology and 
communications 1 0 0
Patton Boggs LLP King, Ryan  Associate 
technology and 
communications 1 0 0
Patton Boggs LLP Lane, Margaret  Senior Paralegal 
technology and 
communications 0 0 0
Patton Boggs LLP Lodge, Deborah  Partner 
technology and 
communications 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Martin, Kevin  Partner 
technology and 
communications 1 0 0
Patton Boggs LLP Moran, Janet  Partner 
technology and 
communications 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Reeder, James  Senior Counsel 
technology and 
communications 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Reisenfeld, Kenneth  Partner 
technology and 
communications 1 0 0
Patton Boggs LLP Richter, Jennifer  Partner 
technology and 
communications 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Sachs, Lesley Bowling  Associate 
technology and 
communications 1 0 0
Patton Boggs LLP Stolbach, Richard  Partner 
technology and 
communications 1 0 0
Patton Boggs LLP Turner, Jeffrey  Partner 
technology and 
communications 1 0 1
Patton Boggs LLP Yarowsky, Jonathan  Partner 
technology and 
communications 1 0 1
Notes: Employee listings and biographies as of November 2010. Bar indicates bar associaion membership. 
Issue-specific training indicates the academic or professional technical background, including military.
Reference web pages: http://www.pattonboggs.com/attorneys/List.aspx and http://www.cassidy.com/team/
Appendix Table A3: Technical Expertise in Two Large Lobbying Firms (cont.) 
Appendix A1: Lobbying Report Issue List 
ACC Accounting         HCR Health Issues  
ADV Advertising         HOU Housing  
AER Aerospace         IMM Immigration  
AGR Agriculture         IND Indian/Native American Affairs  
ALC Alcohol & Drug Abuse       INS Insurance  
ANI Animals        LBR Labor Issues/Antitrust/ Workplace  
APP Apparel/Clothing Industry/Textiles      LAW Law Enforcement/Crime/ Criminal Justice  
ART Arts/Entertainment        MAN Manufacturing  
AUT Automotive Industry        MAR Marine/Maritime/ Boating/Fisheries  
AVI Aviation/Aircraft/ Airlines       MIA Media (Information/ Publishing)  
BAN Banking         MED Medical/Disease Research/ Clinical Labs  
BNK Bankruptcy         MMM Medicare/Medicaid  
BEV Beverage Industry        MON Minting/Money/ Gold Standard  
 
BUD Budget/Appropriations       NAT Natural Resources  
CHM Chemicals/Chemical Industry       PHA Pharmacy  
CIV Civil Rights/Civil Liberties       POS Postal  
CAW Clean Air & Water (Quality)       RRR Railroads  
CDT Commodities (Big Ticket)       RES Real Estate/Land Use/Conservation  
COM Communications/ Broadcasting/Radio/TV   REL Religion  
CPI Computer Industry        RET Retirement  
CSP Consumer Issues/Safety/ Protection      ROD Roads/Highway  
CON Constitution         SCI Science/Technology  
CPT Copyright/Patent/ Trademark       SMB Small Business  
DEF Defense        SPO Sports/Athletics  
DOC District of Columbia        TAX Taxation/Internal Revenue Code  
DIS Disaster Planning/Emergencies       TEC Telecommunications 
ECN Economics/Economic Development     TOB Tobacco  
EDU Education         TOR Torts  
ENG Energy/Nuclear        TRD Trade (Domestic & Foreign)  
ENV Environmental/Superfund       TRA Transportation  
FAM Family Issues/Abortion/ Adoption      TOU Travel/Tourism  
FIR Firearms/Guns/ Ammunition       TRU Trucking/Shipping  
FIN Financial Inst.s/Investments/Securities     URB Urban Development/ Municipalities  
FOO Food Industry (Safety, Labeling, etc.)     UNM Unemployment  
FOR Foreign Relations        UTI Utilities  
FUE Fuel/Gas/Oil         VET Veterans  
GAM Gaming/Gambling/ Casino       WAS Waste (hazard/solid/interstate/nuclear)  
















Appendix A3: Chamber, Congressional Committee, Lobbying Issues 
_________________________________ 
House, Agriculture: AGR, FOO, TOB, ANI, CDT 
House, Appropriations: BUD 
House, Armed Services (103rd, 109-110th): AER, DEF, HOM, INT 
House, National Security (104th - 108th): AER, DEF, HOM, INT 
House, Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs (103rd): HOU, FIN, INS, RES, MON, BAN, BNK, URB, GAM  
House, Banking and Financial Services (104th - 106th): HOU, FIN, INS, RES, TUE, BAN, BNK, URB, GAM  
House, Financial Services (106th - 110th): HOU, FIN, INS, RES, WED, BAN, BNK, URB, GAM  
House, Budget: BUD 
House, District of Columbia (103rd): DOC 
House, Education and Labor (103rd, 110th): EDU, FAM, LBR, RET, ALC, WEL, REL, ART 
House, Economic and Educational Opportunities (104th): EDU, FAM, LBR, RET, ALC, WEL, REL, ART 
House, Education and the Workplace (105th - 109th): EDU, FAM, LBR, RET, ALC, WEL, REL, ART 
House, Energy and Commerce (103rd, 107th - 110th): ACC, CSP, ENG, TEC, FOO, FUE, ALC, MMM, MED, 
ENV, SPO, TRD, TOU, HCR, CAW, WAS, UTI, PHA, MAN, ADV, MIA, CPI, COM, CDT, CHM, BEV, AUT, 
APP 
House, Commerce (104th - 106th): ACC, CSP, ENG, TEC, FOO, FUE, ALC, MMM, MED, ENV, SPO, TRD, 
TOU, HCR, CAW, WAS, UTI, PHA, MAN, ADV, MIA, CPI, COM, CDT, CHM, BEV, AUT, APP 
House, Foreign Affairs (103rd, 110th): FOR, ECN, REL  
House, International Relations (104th - 109th): FOR, ECN, REL  
House, Government Operations (103rd): GOV, POS, DOC  
House, Government Reform and Oversight (104th - 109th): GOV, POS, DOC  
House, Oversight and Government Reform (110th): GOV, POS, DOC  
House, House Administration (103rd, 109-110th): GOV 
House, House Oversight (104th - 108th): GOV 
House, Judiciary: LAW, CON, CPT, IMM, CIV, TOR, FIR 
House, Merchant Marine and Fisheries (103rd): MAR 
House, Natural Resources (103rd, 110th): MAR, NAT, IND, RES, GAM, CDT  
House, Resources (104h - 109th): APR, NAT, IND, RES, GAM, CDT  
House, Post Office and Civil Service (103rd): POS 
House, Public Works and Transportation (103rd): MAR, RRR, ROD, TRA, TRU, DIS  
House, Transportation and Infrastructure (104th - 110th): APR, RRR, ROD, TRA, TRU, DIS  
House, Rules, GOV 
House, Science, Space, and Technology (103rd): ENG, SCI, AER, AVI, CPI 
House, Science (104th - 109th): ENG, SCI, AER, AVI, CPI 
House, Science and Technology (110th): ENG, SCI, AER, AVI, CPI 
House, Small Business: SMB 
House, Standards of Official Conduct: GOV 
House, Veterans Affairs: VET 
House, Ways and Means: UNM, TRD, TAX, WEL, RET 
House, Intelligence (Select): INT, HOM 
House, Homeland Security (Select 107th and 108th; Standing, 109th-110th): HOM 
House, Energy Independence and Global Warming (Select, 110th): ENG, FUE, CDT, CAW, ENV 
House, Investigate the Voting Irregularities of August 2, 2007 (Select, 110th): GOV 
Senate, Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry: AGR, FOO, TOB, ANI, CDT 
Senate, Appropriations: BUD 




Senate, Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs: HOU, URB, INS, RES, GAM, BAN, CDT, FIN, TRD, ECN, 
MON, BNK, ACC 
Senate, Budget: BUD 
Senate, Commerce, Science, and Transportation: AVI, ADV, AER, APP, AUT, COM, CPI, CSP, MAN, MAR, 
MIA, RRR, ROD, SCI, TEC, SPO, PHA, TRD, TRA, TOU, TRU, CHM, BEV 
Senate, Energy and Natural Resources: ENG, NAT, FUE, WAS, CDT, UTI  
Senate, Environment and Public Works: ENV, DIS, CAW, ROD, ECN, WAS  
Senate, Finance: UNM, TRD, TAX, WEL, RET, MMM  
Senate, Foreign Relations: FOR, ECN, REL  
Senate, Governmental Affairs (103rd to 108th): GOV, HOM, INT, POS 
Senate, Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (109th): GOV, HOM, INT, POS 
Senate, Judiciary: LAW, CON, CPT, IMM, CIV, TOR, FIR 
Senate, Labor and Human Resources (103rd to 106th): EDU, FAM, LBR, RET, ALC, WEL, REL, ART, HCR, 
MED 
Senate, Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (107th to 109th): EDU, FAM, LBR, RET, ALC, WEL, REL, 
ART, HCR, MED 
Senate, Rules and Administration: GOV 
Senate, Small Business (103rd to 107th): SMB 
Senate, Small Business and Entrepreneurship (108th and 109th): SMB 
Senate, Veterans Affairs: VET 
Senate, Aging (Special): RET, HCR 
Senate, Intelligence (Select): INT, HOM 
Senate, Ethics (Select): GOV 
Senate, Indian Affairs (Select): IND, GAM 
Joint, Library: GOV 
Joint, Printing: GOV 
Joint, Taxation: TAX 
Joint, Economic: ECN 
 
 
 